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Julia D'Alesandro
Clerk of the Court

S t a t e of Utah,
ORDER
Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 960560-CA
v.Adrian Russell Hickey,
Defendant and Appellant.

This matter is before the court upon the appellee's motion
to strike appellant's brief, filed July 2, 1997. Appellant's
response to the motion to strike appellant's brief was filed July
18, 1997. Appellant's response was accompanied by a stipulation
of the parties that appellant shall have 3 0 days to correct
appellant's brief by including cites to the record.
Now, therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that appellant is
granted leave to file a corrected brief to include citations to
the record. Such brief shall be due within 15 days of the date
hereof.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the record on appeal sjiall be
forwarded to appellant's counsel for his use in preparing the
corrected brief. Counsel shall also return the record to this
court within 15 days from the date hereof.
Dated this S

day of August, 1997.

FOR THE COURT:
0

Michael J. Wilkins,
Associate Presiding Judge
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Jurisdiction
This appeal isfromthe district court's denial of appellant's motion to withdraw his
guilty pleas to two second degree felonies and two third degree felonies. The Court of
Appeals has jurisdiction in this case pursuant to U.C. A. § 78-2a-3(f) and U.RCr.P
26(2)(b).
Statement of the Issues
I.

First Issue: Whether the District Court's denial of Hickey's Motion to Withdraw

Guilty Plea on grounds of "res judicata" was improper where Hickey had made no prior
motion and had not appeared before Judge Lyle R. Anderson to be heard on any such
motion.
Standard of appellate review: Whether Hickey's Motion to Withdraw Guilty
Plea had been denied on a prior occasion is a question of fact. A trial court's findings of
fact are not set aside unless they are found to be clearly erroneous. See. State v.
Thurman. 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996); State v. Blair. 868 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993).
Grounds for seeking review: The district court's order denying Hickey's motion
to withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds that Hickey's motion had been previously heard
is based an erroneous belief of Judge Halliday. (R. at 180, Addendum at XLVTQ). Hickey
requested a hearing prior to the judge's decision, (R. at 174, Addendum at XLVII),fileda
motion to reconsider, (R. at 187, Addendum at L), and a request for a hearing following
the decision, (R. at 187, Addendum at L), in an effort to correct Judge Halliday's
erroneousfindingof fact. Judge Halliday did not grant either of Hickey's requests for a
hearing nor did he grant the motion to reconsider.
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II.

Second Issue: Whether the District Court's denial of Hickey's Motion to

Withdraw Guilty Plea on the grounds that the motion was "untimely" was improper where
Hickey had not been informed at the time of sentencing of the 30-day limit for the filing of
such motions as is required by Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(7).
Standard of appellate review: The effect of failing to comply with constitutional
and procedural requirements is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. See,
State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1996) (citing generally State v. Pena, 869 P.2d
932, 936, 938 (Utah 1994); Willett v. Barnes, 842 P.2d 860, 861 (Utah 1992). The
court's determination that a defendant has not shown good cause to withdraw a guilty
plea is not overturned unless the trial court abused its discretion. State v. TrujilloMartinez, 814 P.2d 596 (Utah 1991), cert, denied 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992).
Grounds for seeking review: Hickey properly raised this issue before Judge
Halliday in his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Withdraw Guilty Plea, paragraphs 3, 8, 9, (R. at 162, 163, Addendum at XL, XLI),
and in his Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea,
paragraphs 3-6. (R. at 187, Addendum L).
DDL

Third Issue: Whether the court's dismissal of Hickey's motion as untimely was

improper where the motion constituted a petition for extraordinary relief under U.R.C.P.
65B.
Standard of appellate Review: This issue involves the application of rules and
principles and is therefore a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. See, State
v^Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994).
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Grounds for review: Appellant's motion to withdraw guilty plea and supporting
memorandum raised the issue of extraordinary relief. (R. at 162, 163, Addendum XL,
XLI). Appellant was unable to preserve the issue on the record because the motion was
dismissed as untimely and res judicata without a hearing on the merits.
IV.

Fourth Issue: Whether the District Court's denial of Hickey's Motion to

Withdraw Guilty Plea was improper and a violation of Hickey'srightto Due Process
where the court failed to grant a hearing on the motion.
Standard of appellate review: Whether the court followed correct procedure is
a question of law which the court review for correctness. See, State v. Pena, 869 P.2d
932, 935 (Utah 1994).
Grounds for seeking review: Hickey petitioned the court for a hearing on his
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea on May 17th, 1996 and on June 13th, 1996. (R. at 174,
185, Addendum at XLVII). Hickey also requested a hearing on the matter in his Motion
for Reconsideration, dated June 14th, 1996. (R. at 187, Addendum at L).
V.

Fifth Issue: Whether Hickey's pleas, entered on July 6, 1992, were improperly

accepted by the court where Hickey had been confined for two weeks in the Carbon
County jail and deprived of his prescribed psychotropic medications, thus being rendered
mentally incompetent.
Standard of appellate review: Whether Hickey acted knowingly and voluntarily
in entering his pleas is a question of fact and is reviewed incorporating the clearly
erroneous standard. See, State v. Holland 921 P.2d 430. 433 (Utah 1996).
Grounds for seeking review: Hickey properly raised this issue before Judge
Halliday in his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and Memorandum in Support of Motion
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
3 may contain errors.

to Withdraw Guilty Plea, paragraphs 4-7, and in his Motion for Reconsideration of Order
Denying Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, paragraph 7. (R. at 162, 163, 187, Addendum
at XL, XLI, L). Additionally, the question of voluntariness of a plea may be raised for the
first time on appeal. State v. Pharris. 798 P.2d 772, 774 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing
State v.Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
VI.

Sixth Issue: Whether the District Court acted in violation of Hickey's

Constitutionalrightsas guaranteed by the Utah Constitution, article I, section 24 by taking
jurisdiction in a case involving a minor without the prosecution first seeking certification
from the juvenile court.
Standard of appellate review: Interpretation of constitutional provisions are
questions of law and are governed by the correction of error standard. See. State v. Pena.
869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994); State v. Humphrey. 823 P.2d 464, 465-66 (Utah 1991).
Grounds for seeking review: Appellant, acting pro se, raised this issue before
the court in a separate civil action. In the same order denying appellant's motion to
withdraw guilty plea, the trial court stayed the civil action claiming that Hickey had not
been properly sent before the district court. (R. at 180, Addendum at XLVIII). This
matter is now presented to the court in the interest ofjudicial economy and a sense of
caution, appellant not wanting to lose the opportunity to present this issue now or in the
future.
Determinative Constitutional Provisions. Statutes. Ordinances, and Rules
Utah Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
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Utah Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 24
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
Statement of the Case
The facts material to a consideration of the questions presented are as follows:
a. On August 7, 1990, the Appellant, then 17 years of age, together with two
other minors, was charged by Information in the Seventh Judicial District Court with 11
felony counts. Nothing wasfirstfiledwith the Juvenile Court and no certification hearing
to transfer the casefromthe Juvenile Court to the District Court was ever held. Appellant
was thereafter held in the Carbon County Jail, and has been continuously confined by the
State of UtahfromAugust 7, 1990 to the present, a period of approximately seven years.
b. In October, 1990, Appellant was ordered by Judge Boyd Bunnell of the
Seventh Judicial District Court to undergo a psychiatric evaluation at the Utah State
Mental Hospital. See, Order for Mental Evaluation, October 15, 1990. (R. at 30,
Addendum at XV). The reportfromDr. Robert J. Howell opined that Hickey was
"seriously mentally ill." See, Mental Health Assessment, Robert J. Howell, Ph.D,
November 6, 1990. (Addendum at XVII).
c. In December, 1990, Appellant appeared before the Court and entered a plea of
guilty but mentally ill to six of the 11 counts and was committed to the Utah State Mental
Hospital under the Psychiatric Security Review Board's jurisdiction to an indeterminate
sentence of 5 years to life with all other charges to run concurrently. See. Judgment of the
Seventh District Court, December 3, 1990. (R. at 73, Addendum at XXI).
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d. With the help and assistance of others, on December 4, 1991, Appellant filed a
Petition for Habeas Corpus relief, alleging his plea was involuntary because he was
mentally ill and incompetent at the time of the entry of plea. (Hickey's Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus is missingfromthe official court record but that it existed is apparent
because a hearing was held thereon on April 20, 1992 and the Petition was dismissed.
See, Minute Entry of the Seventh District Court, April 20, 1992. (R. at 101, Addendum at
XXIX)).
e. On March 5, 1992, Appellantfileda motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the
grounds that the plea was entered involuntarily due to mental illness. See, Motion and
Memorandum to Withrdraw Guilty Plea. (R. at 95, 96, Addendum at XXHI). On April
20, 1992, the trial Court granted Appellant's motion to withdraw guilty plea and also
ruled that the pending Habeas Corpus Petition was mute and dismissed it. See, Order of
the Seventh District Court, May 14, 1992. (R. at 106, Addendum at XXXII) On April
21, 1992, Appellant appeared in the Seventh Judicial District Court and plead "Not Guilty
by Reason of Insanity". The Trial Court ordered the Appellant to be examined by the
Utah Department of Human Resources at the Utah State Hospital. See, Order of the
Seventh District Court, April 21, 1992. (R. at 103, Addendum at XXX).
f. Evaluators at the Utah State Mental Hospital then informed the Court that
Appellant was competent to proceed, provided he remained on his medication. See, letter
from J. Anthony Gillett, MD, dated June 23, 1992 (R. at 169, Addendum at XXXIII);
letterfromRobert J. Howell, Ph.D., dated June 23, 1992. (Addendum at XXXVI).
(Although the copies of these reports are not date stamped by the court, the reports were
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in the possession of the court at the time the plea was taken. See, Order on Defendant's
Mental Competency, July 8, 1992. (R. at 119, Addendum at XXXVIII).
g. Appellant was transferred to the Carbon County Jail on or about June 22, 1992,
to await further proceedings, but was given only one day's medication when he left the
State Mental Hospital and was not given any additional medication while at the Carbon
County Jail. See, Utah State Hospital Nursing Discharge Summary. (R. at 177,
Addendum at L). (The record indicates the discharge medications as ordered and then an
amount sent with patient. The amount sent says "none," with the word "none" lined out
and 1 1/2 written in below.)
h. Two weeks later, on July 6, 1992, Appellant appeared before the Court to
enter his plea and be sentenced. He plead guilty to two second degree felonies and two
third degree felonies, the sentences to be served concurrently. See, Judgment and
Commitment to State Prison, July 8, 1992. (R. at 121). At the sentencing hearing, the
Court failed to advise the Appellant concerning the 30-day time limitation forfilinga
motion to withdraw his guilty plea and failed to inform him about the time limitations for
filing an appeal. See, Transcript of Sentencing held on July 6, 1992. (R. beginning at 233,
Addendum beginning at LVI).
i. The Court failed to conduct a mental competency hearing as required by U.C.A.
77-15-6(3)(4), before accepting Appellant's pleas, but relied on the evaluating doctors'
reports and the Appellant's ascent in determining that the Appellant was mentally
competent. However, the Court did not ascertain whether the Appellant had remained on
his medication during the period of time he was in the Carbon County Jail before
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concluding that the Appellant was competent to proceed. See, Transcript of Sentencing
held on July 6, 1992, p. 3-5. (R. at 235-237).
j . Following the July 6, 1992 sentencing, Appellant was transferred to the Utah
State Prison system. His prison records reflect that he was fading in and out of mental
competency and prison officials were considering petitioning to transfer him to the State
Mental Hospital. (Evidence of this assertion does not exist on record because Hickey's
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea was denied without a hearing, such denial being a major
point of this appeal.)
k. On May 17, 1995, Appellantfileda motion to withdraw his guilty plea of July
6, 1992, pursuant to Section §77-13-6, U.C. A. His motion relied on Rule 65(b), URCP,
Rule 11(e)(7), URCrP and Rule 22(c), URCrP. The basis for Appellant's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea was (1) he had been unconstitutionally prosecuted, convicted and
sentenced as an adult in the Seventh Judicial District Court because the charges were
initiallyfiledagainst him in the District Court without any Juvenile Courtfilingor hearing
certifying him to the District Court as an adult, (2) at the time of his entry of plea and
sentencing on July 6, 1992, Appellant had not been provided any medication for a period
of two weeks, and was not mentally competent to proceed, (3) at the time of his
sentencing, July 6, 1992, the District Court Judge failed to notify the Appellant of the 30day time limitation forfilinga Motion to withdraw guilty plea and (4) at the time of
Appellant's sentencing on July 6, 1992, the District Court Judge failed to inform Appellant
of the time limitations forfilinga Notice of Appeal. See, Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
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(R. at 162, Addendum at XL); Memorandum in Support of Motion to Withdraw Guilty
Plea, May 17, 1996. (R. at 163, Addendum at XLI).
1. Appellant requested a hearing on his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. See.
Request for Hearing on Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, May 17, 1996. (R. at 174,
Addendum at XLVII).
m. On June 5, 1996, the District Court, without holding a hearing, denied
Appellant's motion on two grounds. Judge Bruce K. Halliday wrote "at this point in time
the Court should deny the Motion for Withdrawal of the pleas as being untimely". The
Judge somehow also concluded that the Appellant had previously sought the same relief
from a previous motion, that Judge Lyle R. Anderson had denied that earlier motion, and
"that decision is res judicata herein". See, Order of the Seventh Judicial District Court,
Judge Bruce K. Halliday, June 5, 1996. (R. at 180, Addendum at XLVIH). However,
Appellant had not previously moved to withdraw his guilty pleas entered July 6, 1992, and
has never appeared before Judge Anderson on any matter.
n. Following the June 5, 1996 decision, Appellantfileda motion requesting that
the Court reconsider its decision and requesting a hearing. See. Motion for
Reconsideration of Order Denying Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and Request for Oral
Argument, signed June 14, 1996. (R. at 187, Addendum at L). Judge Halliday did not
grant a motion to reconsider or to hold a hearing and Appellantfileda Notice of Appeal.
See. Notice of Appeal, July 5, 1996. (R. at 198, Addendum at LIV).
Summary of Arguments
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I. The trial court'sfindingthat Hickey' s motion was res judicata was clearly
erroneous. Hickey's motion had never been previously heard and was therefore not res
judicata.
II. The trial court erred by denying Hickey's motion on the grounds of
untimeliness. First, the court that received Hickey's plea failed to follow the procedural
rules set forth in U.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(7). Although failure to follow the rule by not advising
the defendant of the 30-day time limit forfilingis not a ground for automatic withdrawal
of the plea, it is sufficient grounds for an extension of the time limit to withdraw.
Second, the facts of appellant's case merit the extension of the time period.
Hickey did not have a hearing to determine his competency at the time of the plea
although his competency was seriously questioned. Pleas which are entered into
involuntarily are constitutionally infirm as compared to merely in violation of a
prophylactic rule. The court should have extended the time and allowed appellant to
argue his case on the merits.
III. Involuntary guilty pleas are subject to collateral attack and can be challenged
under U.R.C.P. 65B. Appellant's motion and its accompanying memorandum were
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of U.R.C.P. 65B. The court denied the petition on
the grounds of res judicata and untimeliness. The facts show that the motion had not been
previously decided by another court. Petitions seeking extraordinary relief in a case such
as this cannot be untimely. Thus, the courts dismissal of the claim was clear error.
IV. Appellant'srightto due process includes arightto a hearing on the merits of
his motion to dismiss. If the court views Hickey's motion as a petition under rule 65B,
then the trial court's dismissal was clearly erroneous as set forth above. If the court holds
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that the motion was merely a motion to withdraw pursuant to the rules of criminal
procedure, the court committed plain error by not allowing a hearing on the matter.
Although the rules of criminal procedure do not expressly require a hearing on every
motion, the rules suggest that a hearing must be held when the motion involves a question
of fact. Federal courts have held in situations such as this that it was clearly erroneous for
the trial court not to hold a hearing to determine the voluntariness of the plea where the
facts as alleged by the defendant would require the court to allow a withdrawal of the
plea.
V. Appellant was not competent at the time he entered his plea. The court did not
hold a hearing to determine appellant's current status but relied on reportsfromthe State
Mental Hospital and stipulation by appellant and his counsel that appellant was mentally
competent to proceed. The very reports relied upon by the court provide that appellant
was competent so long as he was on his medication. In fact, appellant had not been given
his medication during the two weeks he was held in the Carbon County Jail prior to
entering his plea. The court failed to make a determination whether appellant was in
compliance with the medical reports at the time of his plea.
VI. The district court violated Hickey's constitutional rights by taking jurisdiction
in the case of a juvenile under Utah's former directfilestatute. Because of the
constitutional violation, the court acted without jurisdiction in the matter.
Argument
I.

The ruling that Hickey's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas was uRes Judicata" is
clearly erroneous because Hickey's motion had never come before any court.
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In a court order, dated June 5th, 1996, Judge Bruce K. Halliday denied Hickey's
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea stating, "[i]t appears that he has, on another occasion,
moved for such relief and that the same was denied by Judge Lyle Anderson. . . . to the
extent that the matter has been ruled upon by another Judge that decision is res judicata
herein." (R. at 181, Addendum at XLIX).
Res judicata stands for the principle that issues previously decided cannot be ruled
upon again. See, Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 874-75 (Utah 1983).
The purpose of the doctrine is to deny individuals the opportunity to relitigate issues until
they are able to obtain the outcome they desire.
In the case at bar, Hickey had not yet been heard on his Motion to Withdraw
Guilty Plea and that motion had not previously been denied as stated by Judge Halliday.
Hickey has not appeared before Judge Lyle Anderson or any other judge on this matter.
Because Hickey had not previously litigated this issue, the doctrine of res judicata did not
preclude Judge Hallidayfromdeciding the issue on its merits. Whether Hickey's motion
was truly "res judicata" is a question of fact. Judge Halliday'sfindingthat the matter had
been previously ruled upon is clearly erroneous and to the extent the Judge's denial of the
motion was based on the doctrine of res judicata, the denial of the motion should be
overruled.
II.

The District Court's denial of Hickey's motion on the grounds of untimeliness was
improper because Hickey was not informed of the 30-day time limit for the filing
of such motions at his sentencing as required by Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure
11(e)(7)Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(7) states that a court may not accept a

guilty pleafroma defendant until the court has advised the defendant of the time limits for
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filing a motion to withdraw the plea under U.C.A. § 77-13-6. Strict, and not just
substantial, compliance with Subdivision (e) is required. See, State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d
1332, 1334 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772, 775-76 (Utah Ct. App.
1990), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990). In general, compliance with the
requirements of Subdivision (e) is of such importance that failure to comply has been
found by the Utah Supreme Court to constitute good cause as a matter of law to withdraw
the plea. See generally. State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987).
Subdivision (f) of Rule 11 represents a statutory exception to the rule that noncompliance with subdivision (e) allows a defendant to withdraw a plea. "Failure to advise
the defendant of the time limits forfilingany motion to withdraw a plea of guilty . . . is not
a ground for setting the plea aside." U.R.Cr.P. 11(f). However, subdivision (f) does state
that a failure to advise the defendant of the time limit "may be the ground for extending
the time." It is apparentfromrelevant case law that strict compliance with Rule 11(e) is
of the utmost importance to the protection of a defendant's rights. Also apparent is that
though failure to inform a defendant of the time limits to withdraw a plea does not rise to
the level of importance of the other requirements of subdivision (e), that requirement is
sufficiently weighty to allow the extension of that same time limit.
In the July 6, 1992 hearing where the Honorable Boyd Bunnell sentenced Hickey,
Judge Bunnell failed to comply with Rule 11(e)(7) by failing to inform Hickey of the time
limits forfilinga motion to withdraw the plea. Hickey, being unaware of the time limit for
thefilingof a withdrawal motion, and being mentally incompetent, did notfilea motion to
withdraw within the 30-day limit.
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Hickeyfileda withdrawal motion with the court on May 12, 1996. In the
memorandum accompanying that motion, appellant argued to the court that he had not
been properly advised concerning the 30-day time limit. (R. at 165, 167, Addendum at
XLIII, XLV). Judge Halliday, in denying Hickey's motion stated, u[c]ertainly at this point
in time, the Court should deny the Motion . . . as being untimely . . . ." Whether the Judge
considered the merits of extending the time for requesting a withdrawal of the plea in this
case is unclear. No mention is made in the order as to whether the sentencing judge's
error in not advising Hickey of the 30-day limit played a part in Judge Halliday's decision.
Because no mention is made in the order of what considerations played part in the Judge's
decision, appellant must assume for the sake of this argument that the Judge did not
consider extending the time for a motion under Rule 11(e) and (f).
The importance of following certain procedures, specifically those found in Rule
11(e), has been emphasized by the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Supreme Court.
See, State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. Pharris. 798
P.2d 772, 775-76 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990)); State
v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309,
1313 (Utah 1987). The trial court that sentenced Hickey failed to properly advise him.
Such failure gives Hickey proper grounds under Rule 11(f) for an extension of time to file
his withdrawal motion. Judge Halliday should have ruled as to whether Hickey's case
merited an extension of the time limit so that the true issue of Hickey's competency at the
time of sentencing and thereafter could have been investigated by the court. Failure to
consider Hickey's circumstances and the sentencing judge's failure to properly advise
Hickey under Rule 11(e) was abuse of discretion by the court.
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Hickey's circumstances merit an extension of the time to file a withdrawal motion.
First, the court's failure to properly advise Hickey at his sentencing gives him statutory
grounds on which to request an extension of the time under Rule 11(f).
Additionally, appellant affirmatively alleges that he was not mentally competent at
the time of his hearing because he was not being given his prescription medication. Thus,
appellant's claimrisesto more than just a complaint of procedural defect. "[A] plea is
constitutionally infirm, as opposed to only violative of Rule 11, when the plea is not
knowing and intelligent." Salazar v. Warden. 852 P.2d 988, 992 (Utah 1993) (citing
Hasse v. United States. 800 F.2d 123, 126-27 (7th Cir. 1986). Following his hearing,
appellant continued to be mentally incompetent. Because the court's acceptance of
Hickey's plea was more than merely a violation of the procedural safeguards of Rule 11,
and actually rose to the level of a constitutional violation, the court should have been more
willing to consider the merits of the case by extending the time for the filing of the
withdrawal motion.
Although U.C.A. § 78-12-36 is seemingly only applicable to the tolling of statutes
of limitation in civil cases, it does provide some persuasive authority as to the effect of
Hickey's mental incompetence on the 30-day time limitation forfilinga withdrawal
motion.
If a person entitled to bring an action, other than for the recovery of real
property, is at the time the cause of action accrued, either under the age of
majority or mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, the time of
the disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the
action.
U.C.A. § 78-12-36 (as amended). Hickey was entitled to file a motion to withdraw his
plea after it was entered. During that same time and thereafter, Hickey was not mentally
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competent. This court should extend the 30-day limit under Rule 11(f) and allow
appellant to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial.
III.

The trial court's dismissal of appellant's motion as untimely was improper where
appellant's motion to withdraw guilty plea and the accompanying memorandum
constituted a petition for extraordinary relief under U.R.C.P. 65B which can be
filed at any time.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B provides a means whereby a person my seek

relieffromthe court "[w]here no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available . . .
." U.R.C.P. 65B(a). The relief afforded by Rule 65B is available to persons who claim
that their confinement is a wrongful restraint on personal liberty. The relief is available to
persons who claim their imprisonment constitutes a denial of constitutional rights.
Appellant's guilty plea was not made knowingly or voluntarily. Thus, acceptance of the
plea and appellant's subsequent imprisonment constitutes more than a violation of
procedural safeguards andrisesto the level of a constitutional claim. See. Salazar v.
Warden. 852 P.2d 988, 992 (Utah 1993) (citing Hasse v. United States. 800 F.2d 123,
126-27 (7th Cir. 1986). In order for a petitioner to obtain a writ of habeas corpus, he or
she must show more than a violation of Rule 11. The plea must have in fact been not
knowing or voluntary. See. idL at 992. Appellant claims that he was not mentally
competent at the time the plea was entered. Thus, his claim is sufficient to qualify for the
relief found in U.R.C.P. 65B. Additionally, Utah's Rule 11 of Criminal Procedure is
patterned after the Federal Rule 11. See, id at 991. Under Federal law, a defendant who
lacked capacity to enter a knowing guilty plea may make a motion to withdraw the plea
pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or may collaterally attack the
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conviction by seeking a writ of habeas corpus. See, United States v. Masthers. 539 F.2d
721, 726 (D.C.Cir. 1976).
Rule 65B(b)(3) sets forth the items that must be contained in the petition and its
attachments. These items include a statement of the facts, the respondent, the place of
restraint, whether the legality of the restraint has been adjudicated. See, id. Hickey,
acting pro se, substantially complied with the requirements of the rule. Hickey's motion
to withdraw guilty plea states on its face that it isfiledpursuant to U.R.C.P. 65B.
Hickey's memorandum at numbered paragraph 1 states that he is being confined in
violation of his constitutional rights and the place of restraint. The remainder of the
memorandum sets forth in sufficient detail the facts of the case and the basis for the claim.
The trial court dismissed the motion on the grounds of untimeliness and res
judicata. This disposition was improper because petitions pursuant to Rule 65B are not
time barred but can be brought at any time while the petitioner continues to be imprisoned.
Additionally, as argued in Part I above, the court's dismissal on grounds of res judicata
was clear error.
This Court should remand Hickey's case for a trial because Hickey's competence
at the time he entered his plea cannot be determined after the fact. See. State v. Holland.
921 P.2d 430, 435 (Utah 1996).
IV.

The trial court's failure to grant appellant a hearing on his motion to withdraw
guilty plea was a violation of appellant's rights to due process.
The Constitution of Utah provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or

property, without due process of law." Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 7. The right to be heard
on a legal claim or defense has become synonymous with due process.
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Many attempts have been made to further define "due process" but they all
resolve into the thought that a party shall have his day in court-that is each
party shall have the right to a hearing before a competent court, with the
privilege of being heard and introducing evidence to establish his cause or
his defense, after which comes judgment upon the record thus made.
Celebrity Club. Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n. 657 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah 1982)
(citing Christiansen v. Harris. 163 P.2d 314, 316 (Utah 1945).
The issue arises as to whether Hickey was entitled to a hearing on his motion to
withdraw guilty plea. Although the analysis is slightly different, the result is the same
whether appellant's motion is treated as a motion to withdraw or a Rule 65B petition.
If the Court finds that Hickey's motion should have been treated as a Rule 65B
petition, the trial court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing if it found that the
petition wasfrivolouson its face. See. U.R.C.P. 65B(b)(7); Andrews v. Morris. 607 P.2d
816, 821 (Utah) (cert, denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980)). In its order denying the motion, the
court did not use the word "frivolous" but did set forth the grounds of untimeliness and
res judicata. Res judicata is a proper ground for dismissing a Rule 65B petition as
frivolous on its face. See, U.R.C.P. 65B(b)(7). As discussed in this brief at Part I, the
judge's finding that the petition was res judicata was clearly erroneous. Additionally,
timeliness is not a ground for dismissing a Rule 65B petition such as appellant's. Thus, if
this courtfindsthat appellant's motion was a proper 65B claim, the matter should be
remanded for a hearing on the merits.
If the courtfindsthat Hickey's motion was not a proper rule 65B claim, but
chooses to treat the matter merely as a motion to withdraw guilty plea, the court should
stillfindthat the trial court erred by not conducting an evidentiary hearing.
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The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure do not specifically require that a hearing be
held on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. However, Rule 12, governing motions, states,
"[w]here factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its
findings on the record." U.R.Cr.P. 12(c). Additionally, the rule states, "a verbatim record
shall be made of all proceedings at the hearing on motions . ..." U.R.Cr.P. 12(e). These
passages strongly suggest that motions made pursuant to the Rules of Criminal Procedure
should be accompanied by a hearing, at least where factual issues are involved.
One court which allowed a motion to withdraw to be brought under either the Rules of
Criminal Procedure or Rule 65B has suggested that even though the rules of criminal
procedure do not expressly require a hearing, similar procedures to those required by Rule
65B should be followed in order to protect the petitioner's rights to due process. See,
United States v. Masthers, 539 F.2d 721, 726-27 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
In United States v. Crooker, the First Circuit Court held that where a defendant
alleges facts in his or her motion to withdraw, that if proven true would entitle the
defendant to withdraw the plea, a hearing must be held on the motion.
[I]f a Rule 32(d) motion "alleges facts which, if true, would entitle [the
petitioner] . . . to relief, the Court must hold a plenary hearing . . . . That is
to say that the district court may deny a hearing so long as it does so on the
basis of the facts as alleged by the defendant and so long as it would be
within the court's discretion to do so were the facts alleged by the
defendant true."
Although the parties evidently overlooked the Fournier case, its standard
applies to this motion [motion to withdraw guilty plea] and requires a
remand for a hearing.
Crooker, 729 F.2d 889, 890 (1st Cir. 1984) (citing United States v. Fournier, 594 F.2d
276, 279 (1st Cir. 1979); see also, Zaffarano v. United States, 306 F.2d 707, 710 (9th
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Cir. 1962) (remanding for a hearing on motion to withdraw guilty plea where defendant
alleged involuntariness of plea); Hawk v. United States, 340 F.2d 792, 795 (D.C. Cir.
1964) (remanding for a hearing on motion to withdraw guilty plea where defendant
alleged perjury by key witness to grand jury induced plea).
Appellant claims that he was not mentally competent at the time his plea was
entered. If proven true, the fact of appellant's incompetence at the time the plea was
entered would make the acceptance of the plea constitutionally deficient and would entitle
appellant to withdraw the plea. See, United States v. Masthers, 539 F.2d 721, 725-26
(D.C. Cir. 1976); See also, Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 991 (Utah 1993); State v.
Holland, 921 P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1996).
V.

Appellant's pleas of guilty were improperly received by the court because appellant
was mentally incompetent at the time the pleas were entered.
Appellant alleges that he was not mentally competent at the time his pleas were

entered and therefore those pleas were not made knowingly and voluntarily. Conviction
of a defendant based on the defendant's guilty plea that was made while the defendant was
mentally incompetent is a violation of due process. See, Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988,
991 (Utah 1993); United States v. Masthers, 539 F.2d 721, 725-26 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
Utah Code Annotated § 77-15-6 (3), (4) (as amended) requires the trial court to hold a
hearing following the psychiatric evaluation of a defendant in order to determine the
current status of the defendant and whether the defendant is competent to proceed.
Additionally, U.KCr.P. 11(e)(2) states that the court may not accept a pleafroma
defendant that is not made voluntarily.
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Prior to the time Hickey plead guilty on July 6, 1992, he had been held at the Utah
State Mental Hospital for psychiatric evaluation. One evaluator at the hospital informed
the court that as of June 4, 1992, appellant was competent to proceed provided he remain
on his medication. (R. at 171, Addendum at XXXV). Another evaluator withheld
judgment on Hickey's competency. (Addendum at XIX). Appellant was transferred to
the Carbon County Jail on about June 22, 1992 to await further proceedings. While
waiting for his hearing, appellant was not given his prescribed psychotropic medications.
On July 6, 1992, appellant appeared before the trial court and entered guilty pleas
to four felony charges. At the hearing, the court examined the reports provided by the
mental evaluators. The report dated June 23, 1992fromDr. J. Anthony Gillett found
Hickey competent to proceed "as long as he stays on his present medication on a long
term basis in whatever environment he may be." (R. at 171, Addendum at XXXV). Based
on the reports and appellant's stipulation as to his competency, the court proceeded to
accept the guilty pleas. (R. at 236, 237). Appellant's counsel was unaware that appellant
had not been given his medication and the court failed to inquire as to whether the
medication was being taken.
Although Hickey stipulated that he was competent and therefore, no hearing as to
his competency was held, the facts suggest that he was not competent at the time the pleas
were entered. The very reports on which appellant's counsel and the court relied were
based on a contingency that was not true at the time of the hearing. Dr. Gillett's assertion
that Hickey was competent to stand trial was based on the explicit contingency that
Hickey remain on his medication. In fact, Hickey had been deprived of his medication for
two weeks prior to the hearing. Thus, Dr. Gillett's assessment serves to indicate that
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Hickey was likely not competent on July 6, 1992. At the hearing, Hickey stipulated that
he was competent. Such a stipulation is of little value. Hickey was in all likelihood in no
condition to assess his own mental competence at the hearing. See, State v. Holland, 921
P.2d 430, 435 (Utah 1996) (stating that defendant's appearance and ability to answer
"yes, sir," "no, sir," and "guilty" insufficient tofinddefendant mentally competent without
a hearing on the issue). Additionally, appellant's counsel stipulated that Hickey was
competent to proceed. Again, counsel's stipulation provides little assurance of actual
competency because the belief of counsel was based on the medical evaluations and on
appellant's statements.
Finding Hickey competent withoutfirstinquiring as to whether he was taking his
medications was clear error by the court. The trial court should have at least satisfied
itself that the appellant was currently in compliance with the explicit contingency found in
the psychiatric counselor's report.
Whether Hickey was competent to enter a plea was not addressed in Judge
Halliday's June, 1996 order as the Judge dismissed the motion on other grounds
which have been previously discussed.
VI.

The district court violated Hickey's constitutionalrightsby taking jurisdiction in
Hickey's case when Hickey was a juvenile at the time of the commission of the
crimes and the case was directfiledwith the district court without any certification
hearing to determine whether Hickey should be tried as an adult.
In State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court held that the

directfilingstatute, under which Hickey was charged, was a violation of the Utah
Constitution. In Mohi the court held that U.C. A. §78-3a-25 created classes among
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juvenile offenders and that those classes were treated nonuniformly without a reasonable
relationship to a legitimate state purpose.
Hickey was first charged in district court on August 7, 1990. At the time, Hickey
was 17 years of age. The district court took jurisdiction in the matter after it was direct
filed with the court. No hearing were held to determine whether Hickey should have been
tried as an adult.
The facts in this case are the same as those in Mohi. Hickey's constitutional rights
have clearly been violated by the court's assumption of jurisdiction in this case. Because
the court's jurisdiction in the matter was in violation of Hickey'srights,its acceptance of
the pleas was also improper.
Hickey has now been imprisoned for seven years. It would serve no purpose for
the court to now remand the matter for certification hearings and yet, appellant merits
relief. Appellant was treated as an adult in violation of the Utah Constitution. It is clear
that Hickey was not properly before the District Court when he was first charged. All
actions taken by the court were done without proper jurisdiction and thus the sentence
imposed by the court is void. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e) provides that the
court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. This court has interpreted Rule 22(e) to
mean that the trial court has continuing jurisdiction in a matter until the sentence is
corrected. State v. Montoya. 825 P.2d 676 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In the case at bar, the
trial court did not have jurisdiction initially and thus has no basis on which to maintain
"continuing jurisdiction."
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This court should therefore remand the matter to the trial court and allow the trial
court to seek jurisdiction in the matter if it has appropriate grounds for doing so.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, appellant respectfully requests that the Court reverse
the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw guilty plea and remand the matter for
appropriate proceedings in the matter.
Dated this

day of August, 1997.

Keith H. Chiara
Counsel for Appellant
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Addendum
Statutes
U.C.A. § 77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea.
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and
with leave of the court.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by motion and shall be
made within 30 days after the entry of the plea.
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under Rule 65B, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
U.C.A. § 77-15-6. Commitment onfindingof incompetency to stand trial - Subsequent
hearings - Notice to prosecuting attorneys.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (5), if after hearing, the person is found to be
incompetent to stand trial, the court shall order the defendant committed to the custody of
the executive director of the Department of Human Services or his designee for the
purpose of treatment intended to restore the defendant to competency. The court may
recommend but not order placement of the defendant. The court may, however, order that
the defendant be placed in a secure setting rather than a nonsecure setting. The director or
his designee shall designate the specific placement of the defendant during the period of
evaluation and treatment to restore competency.
(2) The examiner or examiners designated by the executive director to assess the
defendant's progress toward competency may not be involved in the routine treatment of
the defendant. The examiner or examiners shall provide a full report to the court and
prosecuting and defense attorneys within 90 days of receipt of the court's order. If any
examiner is unable to complete the assessment within 90 days, that examiner shall provide
to the court and counsel a summary progress report which informs the court that
additional time is necessary to complete the assessment, in which case the examiner shall
have up to an additional 90 days to provide the full report. The full report shall assess:
(a) the facility's or program's capacity to provide appropriate treatment for the defendant;
(b) the nature of treatments provided to the defendant;
(c) what progress toward competency restoration has been made with respect to the
factors identified by the court in its initial order;
(d) the defendant's current level of mental disorder or mental retardation and need for
treatment, if any; and
(e) the likelihood of restoration of competency and the amount of time estimated to
achieve it.
(3) The court on its own motion or upon motion by either party or by the executive
director may appoint additional mental health examiners to examine the defendant and
advise the court on his current mental status and progress toward competency restoration.
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(4) Upon receipt of the full report, the court shall hold a hearing to determine the
defendant's current status. At the hearing, the burden of proving that the defendant is
competent is on the proponent of competency. Following the hearing, the court shall
determine by a preponderance of evidence whether the defendant is:
(a) competent to stand trial;
(b) incompetent to stand trial with a substantial probability that the defendant may become
competent in the foreseeable future; or
(c) incompetent to stand trial without a substantial probability that the defendant may
become competent in the foreseeable future.
(5) (a) If the court enters afindingpursuant to Subsection (4)(a), the court shall proceed
with the trial or such other procedures as may be necessary to adjudicate the charges.
(b) If the court enters a finding pursuant to Subsection (4)(b), the court may order that the
defendant remain committed to the custody of the executive director of the Department of
Human Services or his designee for the purpose of treatment intended to restore the
defendant to competency.
(c) If the court enters a finding pursuant to Subsection (4)(c), the court shall order the
defendant releasedfromthe custody of the director unless the prosecutor informs the
court that commitment proceedings pursuant to Title 62A, Chapter 12, Mental Health, or
Title 62A, Chapter 5, Services to People with Disabilities, will be initiated. These
commitment proceedings must be initiated within seven days after the court's order
entering thefindingin Subsection (4)(c), unless the court enlarges the time for good cause
shown. The defendant may be ordered to remain in the custody of the director until
commitment proceedings have been concluded. If the defendant is committed, the court
which entered the order pursuant to Subsection (4)(c), shall be notified by the director at
least ten days prior to any release of the committed person.
(6) If the defendant is recommitted to the department pursuant to Subsection (5)(b), the
court shall hold a hearing one year following the recommitment.
(7) At the hearing held pursuant to Subsection (6), except for defendants charged with
the crimes listed in Subsection (8), a defendant who has not been restored to competency
shall be ordered released or temporarily detained pending civil commitment proceedings
under the same terms as provided in Subsection (5)(c).
(8) If the defendant has been charged with aggravated murder, murder, attempted
murder, manslaughter, or a first degree felony and the court determines that the defendant
is making reasonable progress towards restoration of competency at the time of the
hearing held pursuant to Subsection (6), the court may order the defendant recommitted
for a period not to exceed 18 months for the purpose of treatment to restore the defendant
to competency with a mandatory review hearing at the end of the 18-month period.
(9) Except for defendants charged with aggravated murder or murder, a defendant who
has not been restored to competency at the time of the hearing held pursuant to
Subsection (8) shall be ordered released or temporarily detained pending civil commitment
proceedings under the same terms as provided in Subsection (5)(c).
(10) If the defendant has been charged with aggravated murder or murder and the court
determines that he is making reasonable progress towards restoration of competency at
the time of the mandatory review hearing held pursuant to Subsection (8), the court may
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order the defendant recommitted for a period not to exceed 36 months for the purpose of
treatment to restore him to competency.
(11) If the defendant is recommitted to the department pursuant to Subsection (10), the
court shall hold a hearing no later than at 18-month intervals following the recommitment
for the purpose of determining the defendant's competency status.
(12) A defendant who has not been restored to competency at the expiration of the
additional 36-month commitment period ordered pursuant to Subsection (10) shall be
ordered released or temporarily detained pending civil commitment proceedings under the
same terms as provided in Subsection (5)(c).
(13) In no event may the maximum period of detention under this section exceed the
maximum period of incarceration which the defendant could receive if he were convicted
of the charged offense. This subsection does not preclude pursuing involuntary civil
commitment nor does it place any time limit on civil commitments.
(14) Neither releasefroma pretrial incompetency commitment under the provisions of
this section nor civil commitment requires dismissal of criminal charges. The court may
retain jurisdiction over the criminal case and may order periodic reviews to assess the
defendant's competency to stand trial.
(15) A defendant who is civilly committed pursuant to Title 62A, Chapter 12, Mental
Health, or Title 62A, Chapter 5, Services to People with Disabilities, may still be
adjudicated competent to stand trial under this chapter.
(16) (a) The remedy for a violation of the time periods specified in this section, other than
those specified in Subsection (5)(c), (7), (9), (12), or (13), shall be a motion to compel the
hearing, or mandamus, but not releasefromdetention or dismissal of the criminal charges,
(b) The remedy for a violation of the time periods specified in Subsection (5)(c), (7), (9),
(12), or (13) shall not be dismissal of the criminal charges.
(17) In cases in which the treatment of the defendant is precluded by court order for a
period of time, that time period may not be considered in computing time limitations under
this section.
(18) At any time that the defendant becomes competent to stand trial, the clinical director
of the hospital or other facility or the executive director of the Department of Human
Services shall certify that fact to the court. The court shall conduct a hearing within 15
working days of the receipt of the clinical director's or executive director's report, unless
the court enlarges the time for good cause.
(19) The court may order a hearing or rehearing at any time on its own motion or upon
recommendations of the clinical director of the hospital or other facility or the executive
director of the Department of Human Services.
(20) Notice of a hearing on competency to stand trial shall be given to the prosecuting
attorney. If the hearing is held in the county where the defendant is confined, notice shall
also be given to the prosecuting attorney for that county.
U.C.A. $ 78-12-36. Effect of disability.
If a person entitled to bring an action, other than for the recovery of real property, is at the
time the cause of action accrued, either under the age of majority or mentally incompetent
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and without a legal guardian, the time of the disability is not a part of the time limited for
the commencement of the action.

Rules
U.R.C.P. 65B. Extraordinary relief
(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available,
a person may petition the court for extraordinary relief on any of the grounds set forth in
paragraph (b) (involving wrongful restraint on personal liberty), paragraph (c) (involving
the wrongful use of public or corporate authority) or paragraph (d) (involving the
wrongful use of judicial authority, the failure to exercise such authority, and actions by the
Board of Pardons and Parole). There shall be no special form of writ. Except for instances
governed by Rule 65C, the procedures in this rule shall govern proceedings on all petitions
for extraordinary relief. To the extent that this rule does not provide special procedures,
proceedings on petitions for extraordinary relief shall be governed by the procedures set
forth elsewhere in these rules.
(b) Wrongful restraints on personal liberty.
(1) Scope. Except for instances governed by Rule 65C, this paragraph shall govern all
petitions claiming that a person has been wrongfully restrained of personal liberty, and the
court may grant relief appropriate under this paragraph.
(2) Commencement. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition with the clerk
of the court in the district in which the petitioner is restrained or the respondent resides or
in which the alleged restraint is occurring.
(3) Contents of the petition and attachments. The petition shall contain a short, plain
statement of the facts on the basis of which the petitioner seeks relief. It shall identify the
respondent and the place where the person is restrained. It shall state the cause or pretense
of the restraint, if known by the petitioner. It shall state whether the legality of the
restraint has already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding and, if so, the reasons for the
denial of relief in the prior proceeding. The petitioner shall attach to the petition any legal
process available to the petitioner that resulted in restraint. The petitioner shall also attach
to the petition a copy of the pleadingsfiledby the petitioner in any prior proceeding that
adjudicated the legality of the restraint.
(4) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or
discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in a separate memorandum,
two copies of which shall befiledwith the petition.
(5) Dismissal offrivolousclaims. On review of the petition, if it is apparent to the court
that the legality of the restraint has already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for
any other reason any claim in the petition shall appearfrivolouson its face, the court shall
forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim isfrivolouson its face
and the reasons for this conclusion. The order need not statefindingsof fact or
conclusions of law. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the
claim shall terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal.
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(6) Responsive pleadings. If the petition is not dismissed as beingfrivolouson its face, the
court shall direct the clerk of the court to serve a copy of the petition and a copy of any
memorandum upon the respondent by mail. At the same time, the court may issue an order
directing the respondent to answer or otherwise respond to the petition, specifying a time
within which the respondent must comply. If the circumstances require, the court may also
issue an order directing the respondent to appear before the court for a hearing on the
legality of the restraint. An answer to a petition shall state plainly whether the respondent
has restrained the person alleged to have been restrained, whether the person so restrained
has been transferred to any other person, and if so, the identity of the transferee, the date
of the transfer, and the reason or authority for the transfer. Nothing in this paragraph shall
be construed to prohibit the courtfromruling upon the petition based upon a dispositive
motion.
(7) Temporary relief. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained will be removed
from the court's jurisdiction or will suffer irreparable injury before compliance with the
hearing order can be enforced, the court shall issue a warrant directing the sheriff to bring
the respondent before the court to be dealt with according to law. Pending a determination
of the petition, the court may place the person alleged to have been restrained in the
custody of such other persons as may be appropriate.
(8) Alternative service of the hearing order. If the respondent cannot be found, or if it
appears that a person other than the respondent has custody of the person alleged to be
restrained, the hearing order and any other process issued by the court may be served on
the person having custody in the manner and with the same effect as if that person had
been named as respondent in the action.
(9) Avoidance of service by respondent. If anyone having custody of the person alleged to
be restrained avoids service of the hearing order or attempts wrongfully to remove the
personfromthe court's jurisdiction, the sheriff shall immediately arrest the responsible
person. The sheriff shall forthwith bring the person arrested before the court to be dealt
with according to law.
(10) Hearing or other proceedings. In the event that the court orders a hearing, the court
shall hear the matter in a summary fashion and shall render judgment accordingly. The
respondent or other person having custody shall appear with the person alleged to be
restrained or shall state the reasons for failing to do so. The court may nevertheless direct
the respondent to bring before it the person alleged to be restrained. If the petitioner
waives the right to be present at the hearing, the court shall modify the hearing order
accordingly. The hearing order shall not be disobeyed for any defect of form or any
misdescription in the order or the petition, if enough is stated to impart the meaning and
intent of the proceeding to the respondent.
(c) Wrongful use of or failure to exercise public authority.
(1) Who may petition the court; security. The attorney general may, and when directed to
do so by the governor shall, petition the court for relief on the grounds enumerated in this
paragraph. Any person who is not required to be represented by the attorney general and
who is aggrieved or threatened by one of the acts enumerated in subparagraph (2) of this
paragraph may petition the court under this paragraph if (A) the person claims to be
entitled to an office unlawfully held by another or (B) if the attorney general fails tofilea
petition under this paragraph after receiving notice of the person's claim. A petition filed
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by a person other than the attorney general under this paragraph shall be brought in the
name of the petitioner, and the petition shall be accompanied by an undertaking with
sufficient sureties to pay any judgment for costs and damages that may be recovered
against the petitioner in the proceeding. The sureties shall be in the form for bonds on
appeal provided for in Rule 73.
(2) Grounds for relief Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where a person usurps,
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, whether civil or military, a
franchise, or an office in a corporation created by the authority of the state of Utah; (B)
where a public officer does or permits any act that results in a forfeiture of the office; (C)
where persons act as a corporation in the state of Utah without being legally incorporated;
(D) where any corporation has violated the laws of the state of Utah relating to the
creation, alteration or renewal of corporations; or (E) where any corporation has forfeited
or misused its corporaterights,privileges or franchises.
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On thefilingof a petition, the court may require that
notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing
order requiring the adverse party to appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may
also grant temporary relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65 A.
(d) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply with duty; actions by Board of
Pardons and Parole.
(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose interests are threatened by any of the
acts enumerated in this paragraph may petition the court for relief.
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where an inferior court,
administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction
or abused its discretion; (B) where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or
person has failed to perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust or station; (C)
where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has refused the
petitioner the use or enjoyment of arightor office to which the petitioner is entitled; or
(D) where the Board of Pardons and Parole has exceeded its jurisdiction or failed to
perform an act required by constitutional or statutory law.
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court may require that
notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing
order requiring the adverse party to appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may
direct the inferior court, administrative agency, officer, corporation or other person named
as respondent to deliver to the court a transcript or other record of the proceedings. The
court may also grant temporary relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65 A.
(4) Scope of review. Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in nature, the court's
review shall not extend further than to determine whether the respondent has regularly
pursued its authority.
U.KCr.P. 11. Pleas.
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by
counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be
required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of insanity,
or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty
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by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to
appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set for trial. A
defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an early trial. In cases other
than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of the requirements for
making a written demand for a jury trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill,
and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the
right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) the defendant knows of therightto the presumption of innocence, therightagainst
compulsory self-incrimination, therightto a speedy public trial before an impartial jury,
therightto confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right
to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights
are waived;
(4) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is
entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those
elements;
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the
minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each
offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of
consecutive sentences;
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so,
what agreement has been reached;
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits forfilingany motion to withdraw the
plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised that therightof appeal is limited.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits forfilingany motion to withdraw a
plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea
aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make a motion under Section 7713-6.
(g) (1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed to request
or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of
other charges, the agreement shall be approved by the court.
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall advise the
defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court,
(h) (1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea agreement
being made by the prosecuting attorney.
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon request of the
parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in
advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting
attorney and defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved.
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(3) If the judge then decides thatfinaldisposition should not be in conformity with the
plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to
either affirm or withdraw the plea.
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a
conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the record the
right, on appealfromthe judgment, to a review of the adverse determination of any
specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to
withdraw the plea.
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the other
requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to
determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a103.
U.R.Cr.P. 12. Motions.
(a) An application to the court for an order shall be by motion. A motion other than one
made during a trial or hearing shall be in writing unless the court otherwise permits. It
shall state with particularity the grounds upon which it is made and shall set forth the relief
sought. It may be supported by affidavit or by evidence.
(b) Any defense, objection or request, including request for rulings on the admissibility of
evidence, which is capable of determination without the trial of the general issue may be
raised prior to trial by written motion. The following shall be raised at leastfivedays prior
to the trial:
(1) defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or information other than
that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense, which objection shall
be noticed by the court at any time during the pendency of the proceeding;
(2) motions concerning the admissibility of evidence;
(3) requests for discovery where allowed;
(4) requests for severance of charges or defendants under Rule 9; or
(5) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy.
(c) A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the court for good
cause orders that the ruling be deferred for later determination. Where factual issues are
involved in determining a motion, the court shall state itsfindingson the record.
(d) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to make requests
which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the court shall constitute waiver
thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relieffromsuch waiver.
(e) Except injustices1 courts, a verbatim record shall be made of all proceedings at the
hearing on motions, including suchfindingsof fact and conclusions of law as are made
orally.
(f) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the institution of the prosecution or in
the indictment or information, it may also order that bail be continued for a reasonable and
specified time pending thefilingof a new indictment or information. Nothing in this rule
shall be deemed to affect provisions of law relating to a statute of limitations.
U.R.Cr.P. 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
T rrTT

(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall set a
time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor more than 45 days after
the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, otherwise
orders. Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or may continue or alter
bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a
statement and to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal
cause why sentence should not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given
an opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of sentence.
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, defendant
may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to appear for
sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be issued by the court.
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall impose sentence
and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include the plea or the verdict, if any,
and the sentence. Following imposition of sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of
defendant's right to appeal and the time within which any appeal shall be filed.
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its commitment setting
forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to the jail or prison shall deliver a
true copy of the commitment to the jail or prison and shall make the officer's return on the
commitment and file it with the court.
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner,
at any time.
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose sentence in
accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court retains jurisdiction over a
mentally ill offender committed to the Department of Human Services as provided by Utah
Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b), the court shall so specify in the sentencing order.
U.RCr.P 26. Appeals.
(1) An appeal is taken byfilingwith the clerk of the courtfromwhich the appeal is taken a
notice of appeal, stating the order or judgment appealedfrom,and by serving a copy of it
on the adverse party or his attorney of record. Proof of service of the copy shall be filed
with the court.
(2) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from:
(a) thefinaljudgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea;
(b) an order made, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the defendant;
(c) an interlocutory order when, upon petition for review, the appellate court decides that
the appeal would be in the interest ofjustice; or
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental disease or defect
incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution.
(3) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from:
(a) afinaljudgment of dismissal;
(b) an order arresting judgment;
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of afindingof double jeopardy or denial
of a speedy trial;
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part of it invalid;
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(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to suppress evidence when, upon a
petition for review, the appellate court decides that the appeal would be in the interest of
justice; or
(f) an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest.
(4) (a) All appeals in criminal cases shall be taken within 30 days after the entry of the
judgment appealedfrom,or, if a motion for a new trial or arrest of judgment is made,
within 30 days after notice of the denial of the motion is given to the defendant or his
counsel. Proof of giving notice shall befiledwith the court.
(b) An appeal may not be dismissed except for a material defect in taking it, or for failure
to perfect the appeal, or upon motion of the appellant. The dismissal of the appeal affirms
the judgment unless another appeal may be, and is, timely taken.
(5) Cases appealed in which the defendant is unable to post bond shall be given a preferred
and expeditious setting in the appellate court.
(6) Appeals may be submitted on briefs. If an appellant's brief is filed, the appeal shall be
decided even though a party, upon notice of the hearing, fails to appear for oral argument.
(7) The rules of civil procedure relating to appeals govern criminal appeals to the appellate
court, except as otherwise provided.
(8) (a) In appeals to the Supreme Court of capital cases where the sentence of death has
been imposed, appellant briefs shall befiledwithin 60 days of thefilingof the record on
appeal. Respondent briefs shall befiledwithin 60 days of receipt of the appellant brief. All
issues to be raised on appeal shall be included by each party in its appellate brief.
Appellant reply briefs shall befiledwithin 30 days of receipt of the respondent's brief.
(b) One 30-day extension of the 60-day filing period may be granted to each party, but
only upon application to the Supreme Court showing extraordinary circumstances
warranting an extension.
(c) The Supreme Court shall schedule the oral arguments of the case to be heard not more
than ten days after the date offilingof thefinalbrief Following oral arguments, the case
shall be placedfirston the Supreme Court's calendar, for expeditious determination.
(9) After an initial appeal has been resolved, a subsequent appeal of a capital case where
the sentence of death has been imposed may not be entertained by any court, nor may a
stay of execution of the sentence be granted, when the appeal does not raise any new
matter not previously resolved or when new matter could have been raised at the previous
appeal.
(10) In capital cases where the sentence of death has been imposed and the defendant has
chosen not to pursue his appeal, the case shall be automatically reviewed by the Supreme
Court within 60 days after certification by the sentencing court of the entire record, unless
the time is extended by the Supreme Court for good cause. A case involving the sentence
of death has priority over all other cases in setting for hearing and in disposition by the
Supreme Court.
(11) An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, as is
appropriate,fromallfinalorders and judgments rendered in a district court or juvenile
court under this rule.
(12) An appeal may be taken to the district courtfroma judgment rendered in the justice
court under this rule, except:
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(a) the case shall be tried anew in the district court. The decision of the district court is
final, except when the validity or constitutionality of a statute or ordinance is raised in the
justice court;
(b) within 20 days after receipt of the notice of appeal, the justice court shall transmit to
the district court a certified copy of the docket, the original pleadings, all notices, motions,
and other papersfiledin the case, and the notice and undertaking on appeal;
(c) stay of execution and relief pending appeal are under Rule 27, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure; or
(d) all further proceedings are in the district court, including any process required to
enforce judgment.
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
CARBON COUNT Y.UTAH
IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT 0]f bf&£oN COUNTY
STATE OF U T A H ^ | ? ^ V.! ?
L ^

THE STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff,

/7i*i*« fossil fl<*Z*f **&

. "
DEPUTY

INFORMATION
309-8-90

TINO RUEBEN ARCHULETA
DOB: 3/16/73
Criminal No. 9d

ooo

OS^-FS

AILI KELNA MILLER
DOB: 5/29/74

Criminal No. 9* I Ooo C SS - F $>

PAUL RICHARD PAYNE
DOB: 11/2/73

Criminal No. 9o/Good#&

~ FS

Defendant(s).

COMES NOW, the undersigned Carbon County Attorney, or Deputy Carbon County
Attorney, and under oath states that he has reason to believe that the abovenamed defendant(s) committed the following crime(s):
DATE:

On or about August 4, 1990

PLACE: Carbon County, State of Utah
COUNT I; AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, in violation of Section
76-6-302 (1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said
defendant, at the time and place aforesaid, did unlawfully and intentionally
take personal property in the possession of another from his person or
immediate presence, against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear,
and in the course of committing the above-mentioned robbery, the defendant used
a dangerous weapon or caused serious bodily injury upon another, the victim
being ALICE OLSON?
COUNT II: AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, in violation of Section
,76-6-302 (1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said
defendant, at the time and place aforesaid, did unlawfully and intentionally
(iJ&Ke personal property in the possession of another from his person or
nimmediate presence, against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear,
N\N And in the course of committing the above-mentioned robbery, the defendant used
V(Ay a dangerous weapon or caused serious bodily injury upon another, the victim
^\ / being MELVIN HEIL?
COUNT III: AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Section
76-5-103 (1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said
defendant, at the time and place aforesaid, did intentionally commit an act,
with unlawful force or violence, that caused serious bodily injury to ALICE
OLSON, or did use a dangerous weapon or other means likely to produce death or
serious bodily injury while attempting to do bodily injury to said person;
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INFORMATION
309-8-90
PAGE 2

COUNT IV: AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Section
76-5-103 (1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said
defendant, at the time and place aforesaid, did intentionally commit an act,
v/ith unlawful force or violence, that caused serious bodily injury to MELVIN
HEIL, or did use a dangerous weapon or other means likely to produce death or
serious bodily injury while attempting to do bodily injury to said person;
COUNT V: CHILD KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, in violation of Section 765-301.1 (1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said defendant,
at the time and place aforesaid, intentionally or knowingly without authority
of law and against the will of the victim, seized, confined, detained, or
transported a child under the age of fourteen (14) years with the intent to
keep or conceal said child from his parents or any other person having legal
custody of said child, the victim having the initials of J.S.;
COUNT VI: THEFT, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Section 76-6-404,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said defendant, at the time
and place aforesaid, did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the
property of another, with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof, to-wit: an
operable motor vehicle belonging to NANETTE SMITH;
COUNT VII: FAILURE TO RESPOND TO OFFICER'S SIGNAL TO STOP, a Third Degree
Felony, in violation of Section 41-6-13.5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, in that the said defendant, at the time and place aforesaid, while the
driver of a motor vehicle, having received a visual or audible signal from a
police officer to bring his vehicle to a stop, operated his vehicle in a
willful or wanton disregard of such signal so as to interfere with or endanger
another vehicle or person, or who did attempt to flee or elude a peace officer
by vehicle, and while so doing traveled in excess of 30 miles per hour above
the posted speed limit or caused damage to the property of another or bodily
injury to another;
COUNT VIII: AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Section
76-5-103 (1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said
defendant, at the time and place aforesaid, attempted with unlawful force or
violence to do bodily injury to DENNIS CHRISTENSEN, and in so doing used a
dangerous weapon or other means or force likely to produce death or serious
bodily injury;
COUNT IX: AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Section
76-5-103 (1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said
defendant, at the time and place aforesaid, attempted with unlawful force or
violence to do bodily injury to SHAYNE TERRY, and in so doing used a dangerous
weapon or other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily
injury;
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COUNT X: AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Section
76-5-103 (1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said
defendant, at the time and place aforesaid, attempted with unlawful force or
violence to do bodily injury to SCOTT ROBERTSON, and in so doing used a
dangerous weapon or other means or force likely to produce death or serious
bodily injury;
COUNT XI: ESCAPE, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Section 76-8-309
(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said defendant, at the
time and place aforesaid, escaped from official custody in an institution for
confinement of juvenile offenders and employed force, threat, or a deadly
weapon against a person to effect said escape;
contrary to the provisions of the aforesaid statute, and against the peace and
dignity of the State of Utah.
THIS INFORMATION is based on evidence obtained from the following
witnesses: Scott Henrie, Roy Robinson, Dennis Christensen, Shayne Terry and
Scott Robertson/900800015 & 19 & 38/099000605/901274^901267/>

GENE STRATE
Carbon County attorney
Subscribed and sworn to before me on this

/

day of August, 1990.
CJL^

GS/8/7/90

£1

BRYCE K<^RYNER, Circuit Jud
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SFV^NTH DISTRICT COURT
CAREOH COUNT Y.UTAH
FlUtu

OCT 15
^

^
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GENE STRATE
Carbon County Attorney
Carbon County Courthouse
120 East Main Street
Price, Utah 84501
(801) 637-4700
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER FOR MENTAL EVALUATION
Plaintiff,

vs.
ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY,

Criminal No. 90-41

Defendant.

The above defendant appeared on October 15, 1990, together with his
attorney, AT J .EN THORPE, and entered pleas of guilty and mentally ill to
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony; AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree
Felony; THEFT, a Second Degree Felony and ESCAPE, a Second Degree Felony, and
counsel for the defendant and for the State having recommended that the
defendant be evaluated at the Utah State Hospital;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant be transported forthwith to
the Utah State Hospital to undergo a mental evaluation per Utah Code Annotated
Section 77-16a-l (2), and that the State Hospital advise the Court when the
defendant can appear for a hearing on his claim of mental illness.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the State Hospital release the defendant to
agents of the Carbon County Sheriff's Department to transport and hold the
defendant for trial on other criminal charges on the dates of October 31,
1990, and November 1 and 2, 1990.
DATED this

/5>

day of October, 1990.
BY THE COURTx

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of? the
foregoing Order for Mental Evaluation, postage prepaid, on this j S
October, 1990, toi

day of

Allen Thorpe, Attorney at Law, P. 0. Box 1238, Castle

Dale, Utah, 84513.

17MLJ?,IMM^
MADALENE C. WILLIAMS, Secretary
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State of U t a h
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

UTAH STATE HOSPITAL
Norman R. Bangertcr
Governor
Nonsan G, Angus
Executive Director

Robert A. Vervillt, MSW/CSW
Superintends!

1X0 E.sl 0 * «
P.O Boi 2H>
Pievo. UV.1 M S O W O
(80D37J-MOO

November 6, 1990

The Honorable Boyd Bunnell
.Judge of the Seventh Judicial District Court
Carbon County
Carbon County Courthouse
120 East Main Street
Price, Utah 84501
Re: Utah v Adrian Russell Hickey
Criminal No. 90-41
Dear Judge Bunnell:
This reoort 1s in reference to Adrian Hickey who was committed to the Utah
State H w l t l l on October 16, 1990 for a U u1lty and mentaliy, E v a l u a t i o n .
we have completed our evaluation. It has consisted of multiple psychiatric
interviews multiple psychological interviews, a social case history, a
DhvsUal lamination, an electroencephalogram, and a CT brain scan. Copies of
the Psychological assessment, the social case history, and the physical
examination are enclosed.
,* *

kV

... «„<„<«„ that Kr Hickev is seriously^entall^nTf

He 1s very

f r 9 f r ^

and D U b O « ^ ^ r o ^ f f ? f f h m c r t
In addition, he reports d e l u s l o n s f a n d ^ ^
h S l l S t l b n f t*at Teem incongruous to us. Currently, he is on Sere#BSJZ5tirr
I! _ .-„_inlfi-...„ ..L-nim.r Serentil is an antipsychotic medication and
Jo f u U y w n T 7 e y 3 ? T . ^ ^ " h a l l u c i n a t i o n s .
He also , . t s I«.(,s1h.S w m r t e i - e y e r v eiho»rsM0«01tSt16W, Benadryl 50mg as needed for
ledaSoHno to h^lp the side effects of the Serentil, and Kotrln 800m, as
needed for pain.
Mr Hickey has had a long history of ^nimngr g llJe^r.d^asol1f^dnaMJ^
»««.tis^twlrb-rstreet?drugs\ It may be that some of the aTWrtDryHTWr
^ i K l l K
are associated with the long term effects
of these drugs and solvents.
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Oate of Assessment 10/22/90
10/28/90
Patient Name: Adrian Hickey
Oate of Admission: 10/18/90
Refferal Source: Seventh Judicial District Court for Carbon County
Refferal Question: Guilty and Mentally 111 Evaluation
Assessment Procedures:

Interview with patient
Review of medical records
Review of material owned by Mr. Hickey
-J r Bencier'Gestalt
( • ^ \ . 0 ,'.t
%
TJA; V - v 4-lECtP»£^ha»v^Kenda 11
\ . T J ' nccTFiOV ALL(5^R«8 p 1 c t u r e Vocabulary
'V. ' T c D
^ V - n xieAnFf&S* I n k B 1 o t T e s t
r inUTHOhl^cu ^ - ^ c V s l e r Adult Intel! igence Scale-Revised
.F!LLcD.

INTRODUCTION: Hr. Adrian Hickey was born March 16, 1973. He is 17 years of
age. He said he's 5'11 or 5*12. He weighs 202 pounds. He has black hair and
has been shaved bald. He has brown eyes. He says he shaves his head bald so
he can let the demons out of his head.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION: Mr. Hickey's father is Clarence Hickey. He lives
in Kentucky. His mother is Patrick Quatabaum. The mother has remarried and
lives in Georgia. Hr. Hickey said he came to Utah some time this year, but he
doesn't know when. He said he had been living with his sister in Colorado for
a while. He does remember coming here and their catching him in a stolen
car. Apparently he escaped from the detention center and he's charged with a
number of counts. They include aggravated assault, kidnapping, two counts of
failure to respond to the officer's signal to stop, another count of
aggravated assault and another count of kidnapping. He has a number of
siblings. The oldest is Yvette. She lives in Colorado and works. None of
his siblings graduated from High School. Richard is next. He lives in
Kentucky. Adrian said he doesn't do anything. Oiane is next. She lives in
Colorado. Johnny is in prison in Kentucky. Christina is in Colorado and
doesn't work. Shenatte is in Colorado. Adrian is next. Dledra lives in
Georgia with her mother as does the two youngest children, Brian and Amanda.
Hr. Hickey has a long history of juvenile offenses dating back to 1987 in
Colorado Springs. He apparently was on morphine there and was in the
psychiatric unit for four months. He was in the Colorado State Hospital, the
Atlanta Youth Center, the Augusta Youth Center, Mllledgeville Youth Center,
Jefferson Hospital, Brook Lawn Hospital, Johnson/Breckenridge Treatment Center
where he was treated with Mellaril and Imipramine , Brook Lawn Treatment
Center again, T.J. Sampson Hospital in Kentucky where he had a brief AWOL, and
other types of confinements.
He said he typically uses all the street drugs he can get and all the alcohol
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he can get. I think he has used both of them^^n6ujnr' tu'figdiagnosed as having
alcohol dependency and polysubstance abuse if not dependency. He mentioned
using amphetamines, marijuana, crack, cocaine, ISO, and Crystal, and he said
he drank every day until he passed out.
-When he was admitted, he was diagnosed as having an organic personality
disorder of the explosive type, psychoactive substance abuse with borderline
to mild mental retardation.
Mr. Hickey said he does not read. He said he was in Special Education most of
his life, and he only went to the 8th grade.
BEHAVIOR OURING THE ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE: Mr. Hickey was easy to examine.
He gave up quickly. He cannot read so I had to be very selective as to what
tests I gave him.
INTELLECTUAL FUNCTIONING: I gave Mr. Hickey 2 tests to measure his
intelligence. On the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test he obtained an IQ of
60. I also gave him the Wexler Adult Intelligence Scale Revised Edition. He
has had this test before and further he told me that one of the examiners
helped him on some of the performance items so he did a bit better on this
test. He had a verbal IQ of 67, a performance IQ of 74, with a full scale IQ
of 70. I believe that with his adaptive capacity and the fact that he has had
practice on it before, I think it is safe to conclude that he is of mild
mental retardation.
EVIDENCE OF ORGANIC CEREBRAL DYSFUNCTION: Mr. Hickey was knocked
unconscious at one time in an automobile accident. He doesn't know how long
he was unconscious. I noticed that a CT brain scan and an EEG have been
ordered. The results are not back. He seemed to be oriented as to time,
place, and person. He did not know exactly what the date was. On the two
perceptual motor tests I gave, he scored in the organic range on both of
them. I believe that a diagnosis of an organic personality disorder and a
diagnosis of organic hallucinosis is indicated. He hears voices from time to
time and he has a feeling as though demons are coming out of his head, and I
gathered this was a kinesthetic hallucination.
PERSONALITY INTEGRATION: I was able to give Mr. Hickey the Rorschach Ink
Blot Test. On this he had a good form percent of 60, a poor form percent of
34 and an unusual form percent of 6. In addition he had 2 deviant responses.
He also has a positive family history for mental illness, but I don't know
just what it 1s. We're going to need a good social case history on this man,
COMPETENCY TO PROCEED: I'm going to defer any comments about competency to
proceed until we know more about him. He seems to be mildly mentally
retarded. He has diagnosis of drug and alcohol dependency, and diagnosis of
an organic personality disorder, and a diagnosis of organic hallucinosis.

Paqe ?

UTAH STATE HOSPITAL
FOR
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P. Washburn, MO
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DIAGNOSIS: He has a diagnosis of drug and alcohol dependency, a diagnosis
of an organic personality disorder, and a diagnosis of organic h a l l u c i n o s i s .

Robert J . Howell, Pffl).
C l i n i c a l and Forensic Psychology
RJH:mrb

Date Oictated: 10/28/90

Date Typed: 10/29/90
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BY 7^
GENE STRATE
Carbon County Attorney
Carbon County Courthouse
120 East Main Street
Price, Utah 84501
(801) 637-4700

^frs^nrxQ.
DEPUYY

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

>

Plaintiff,

}

J U D G M E N T

vs.
ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY,

Criminal No. 90-41

Defendant.

The above-named defendant appeared on Monday, December 3, 1990,
together with his attorney of record, ALLEN THORPE, and the defendant having
previously entered his pleas of guilty and mentally ill to the charges of
COUNT Ii

AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony; COUNT IIIi

ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony? COUNT IV:
Felony; COUNT V:

AGGRAVATED

AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree

KIDNAPPING, a Second Degree Felony; COUNT VI: THEFT, a

Second Degree Felony; COUNT VIIi

FAILURE TO RESPOND TO AN OFFICER'S SIGNAL TO

STOP, a Third Degree Felony and COUNT XIi

ESCAPE, a Second Degree Felony, and

Count and counsel having received an evaluation report from the Utah State
Hospital, and counsel for the defendant and for the State having stipulated
that the testimony of the examiners from the State Hospital would be that the
defendant is mentally ill and counsel for the defendant having advised the
Court that he had no legal reason to state why judgment should not be
pronounced, and the Court being fully advised in the premises;
THE COURT FINDS that the defendant has a mental illness and that he
is a danger to himself and others and that it would be appropriate that he be
committed to the Utah State Hospital; and
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IT IS THE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE OF THE COURT that the said ADRIAN
RUSSELL HICKEY serve a term on COUNT I of not less that five (5) years and
which may be for life, on COUNT III serve a term of zero (0) to five (5)
years, on COUNT IV serve a term of zero (0) to five (5) years, on COUNT V
serve a term of not less than one (1) nor more than (15) years, on COUNT VI
serve a term of not less than one (1) nor more than (15) years, on COUNT VII
serve a term of zero (0) to five (5) years, and on COUNT XI serve a terra of
not less than one (1) nor more than fifteen (15) years, with all of said jail
sentences to run concurrently, and defendant is committed to the Utah State
Hospital under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant pay one third of the
restitution incurred to the victims herein.

The Carbon County Attorney shall

file with the Court a notice setting forth the total amount of said
restitution, and counsel for the defendant shall file any objections to said
amount within ten (10) days of receiving a copy of said notice.
-y

Yd

DATED this J-> ^ day of December, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

^

^-^

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Judgment, postage prepaid, on this

-~>

day of December, 1990, to«

Allen Thorpe, Attorney at Law, P. 0. Box 1238, Castle Dale, UT, 84513; Alice
Olson, 211 S. 400 W., Price, UT, 84501?
UT, 84501;

Nannette Smith, 457 S. 300 W., Price,

Mel Heil, 180 Locust, Helper, UT, 84526.

TXtA/to&J/lltj.

U&2&L.
MADALENE C. WILLIAMS, Secretary
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH

Adrian Russell Hickey
Attorney Pro Se
P.O. Box 270
Provo, Utah 84603

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

S t a t e of UicxK
ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY,

MOTION TO WITHDRAW
PLEA OF GUILTY

Plaintiff,
vs.
Criminal No. 90-41
ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY,
Defendant,
The Defendant, Adrian Russell Hickey, by and through himself,
Attorney Pro Se, and pursuant to the Utah Code of Criminal
Procedure 77-13-6 U.C.A. Amended files this Motion to Withdraw his
Guilty plea.
The Defendant wishes to withdraw his plea of guilty and the
court has indicated he should submit a document. The plea was not
taken voluntarily. The Defendant motions the Court to allow him to
withdraw his Guilty plea and does so in conjunction with the
enclosed Memorandum in support of this Motion.
Respectfully submitted.
DATED this &/

day of February, 1992.

Qj&acM IC k
Adrian Russell Hickey
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH

Adrian Russell Hickey
Attorney Pro Se
P.O. Box 270
Provo, Utah 84603

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ADRIAN RU33ELL HICKEY,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO WITHDRAW
HIS GUILTY PLEA

Plaintiff,
vs.

Criminal No. 910400597

ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY,

Judge Cullen Y. Christensen

Defendant.

The Defendant , Adrian Russell Hickey, by and through himself,
Attorney Pro Se, and pursuant to the Utah Code of Criminal
Procedure 77-13-6 U.C.A. Amended files this Memorandum of Support
of his Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea.

FACTS and ARGUMENT
1.

That the defendant, above-named is presently wrongfully

unconstitutionally

confined,

detained

and

restrained

in

his

personal liberty by the State of Utah under the color of state law
at the Utah State Prison, located at Post Office Box 250, Draper,
Utah 84020.
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2.

The reason for this motion is that the plea was not taken

voluntarily which has resulted in unconstitutional confinement,
imprisonment and restraint presently imposed upon the Defendant is
by virtue of the following conviction obtained and entered against
the Defendant

as the result of a plea of guilty before the

Honorable Boyd Bunnell, Judge of the Seventh Judicial District
Court of Carbon County, State of Utah, in criminal case number 9041. Attached hereto is a copy of the Defendant's Judgement in this
case

dated

December

3,

1990

for

the

Honorable

Court's

consideration.
3.

That the Honorable Boyd Bunnell, Judge of the Seventh

Judicial District Court, in and for Carbon County, State of Utah,
erred in his acceptance of the guilty plea entered by the Defendant
in criminal case number 90-41, in counts I, III, IV, V, VI, VII and
XI.

The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is very specific on

accepting pleas, Rule 11 - Pleas, (5) of the statute, which in the
pertinent part states:
4„

The Court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no

contest and shall not accept such a plea until the court has made
the findings:
(a)

if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he

has knowingly waived his right to counsel and does not desire
counsel;
(b)

the plea is voluntarily made;

(c)

the defendant knows he has rights against compulsory

self-incrimination, to a jury trial, and to confront and cross2
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examine in open court the witnesses against him, and that by
entering the plea he waives all of those rights;
(d)

the defendant understands the nature and elements of

the offense to which he is entering the plea; that upon trial the
prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those elements
beyond a reasonable doubt; and that the plea is an admission of all
those elements;
(e)

the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence

that may be imposed upon him for each offense to which a plea is
entered, including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive
sentences;
(f)

if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea

discussion and plea agreement, and if no, what agreement has been
reached; and
(g)

the defendant has been advised of the time limits

for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest*
5.

In the case at bar the medical professionals responsible

for his evaluation for competency were in total agreement that the
defendant

was

completely

unable

to

make

a

voluntary

plea,

understand his rights; understand the nature and elements of the
offenses, that the burden was on the prosecution to prove the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt, understand the possible minimum
and maximum sentences, understand the plea discussion and results
of those discussions and understand the time limits to file a
withdrawal of a guilty plea, or appeal (evaluation attached).

3
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The record in the instant case at bar, that the petitioner was
evaluated by a physician and psychologist. These medical examiners
state the Petitioner would meet the Listing of Impairments (20 CFR
CH. Ill Part 404 P, App. 1, 12.05) for mental retardation which
would make him qualify for Social Security Disability.

This would

imply the defendant is extremely impaired.
The evaluation mental health specialists also indicated that
the defendant was "seriously mentally ill" and likely suffering
from "organic personality disorder of the explosive type."
The

defendant

was

also

taking

the

following

"Serentil 25 mg. twice a day and 75 mg. at night.

medication

Serentil is an

antipsychotic medication and hopefully will help his delusions and
hallucinations. He also get Inapsine 5 mg. as needed every 8 hours
for agitation, Benadryl 50 mg. as needed for sedation and help the
side effects of the Serentil, and Motrin 800 mg. as needed for
pain."

The evaluation doctors1 concluding opinion is ..." Mr.

Hickey is not competent to proceed.

We believe that his metal

illness or illnesses have seriously compromised his ability to
rationally and factually aid in his won defense and to cooperate
with his lawyer.

Further, it is our opinion that he was not

competent to proceed when he made the plea of guilty and mentally
ill: We would request that his guilty and mentally ill plea be set
aside, that he be found not competent to proceed, and the he be
kept at the Utah State Hospital to see if we will be able to
restore him to such a condition that he would be competent to
proceed."

(See attached of these doctors' findings).

4
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Sincerely Your(s)
Robert J. Howell, Ph.D.
Clinical and Forensic Psychology
Philip Washburn, M.D.
Clinical Director
Forensic Security Unit
Based upon the above information and the Utah State Statute
mandating a certain level of competence in understanding the nature
of the crime, the elements , the burden of proof and my rights at
trial etc,, which must be apparent before a plea is accepted*
Defendant should be allowed to withdraw his Guilty Plea.
Respectfully submitted,
DATED this rJ/Y day of February, 1992.

fl^JJMA r&\
Adrian R u s s e l l Hickey

5
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The

SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF CARBON, STATE OF UTAH

BOYD BUNNELL, JUDGE

Date:

ELECTRONIC RECORDING

Case No.:

ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY, Plaintiff

April 20, 1992 - 1:30 p.m.
Civil No. 91-266
Criminal No. 90-41

Pro Se

vs
BOB VERVILLE, Defendant
(No Present)

David F. Bryant

STATE OF UTAH, Plaintiff

Gene Strate

vs
ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY, Defendant

Keith H. Chiara

MINUTE ENTRY
Proceeding before the Court:

HEARING (Writ of Habeas Corpus)

As to the Motion to Set Aside the Plea in Criminal No. 90-41, the
Court heard statements of counsel and upon being fully advised in the
premises, now
ORDERS: That it will grant defendant's motion to set aside his plea
of guilty. Upon motion of the State, the Court will order all eleven
counts be reinstated. There being no objection from defendant, the Court
will appoint Keith H. Chiara as counsel for defendant. Defendant is
remanded to the custody of the Carbon County Jail pending dispostion of
the criminal matter. Bail is set in the amount of $50,000.00. This
matter is continued to 11:00 a.m. tomorrow (April 21, 1992) for entry of
plea or motion for a preliminary hearing.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: That the Motion for Writ of Habeas Corpus in
Civil No. 91-266 is dismissed as the matter is now moot.
bap
Tape 92-20:

3485
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UTAH
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
|i

STATE OF UTAH,

ORDER APPOINTING EXAMINER

Plaintiff,
vs.

;
|i

ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY,

Criminal No. 90-41

Defendant.
The above named defendant having entered a plea of
not guilty by reason of insanity under the provisions of
77-14-4 of the Utah Code, THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS that the
Department of Human Services designate competent persons or
organizations to examine Adrian Russell Hickey to evaluate
his mental condition.
THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS that the report of such
persons

or

organizations

shall

be made

available

to

the

Court, and to the attorney for Mr. Hickey, and the Carbon
County Attorney, within 30 days of this order.

The Court

will set a trial date as soon as the report is available.
Dated this <<7>/^ day of April, 1992.

BUNKfeLL,

ttfl^fcc t Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing

ORDER APPOINTING EXAMINER

by

depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage
prepaid, to the following:
Keith H. Chiara
Attorney at Law
37 East Main St
Price UT

84501

John Lesnan
DIVISION OF MENTAL HEALTH
Department of Human Services
120 North 200 West
Salt Lake City UT
84103
Gene E. Strate
County Attorney
County Office Building
120 East Main Street
Price UT
84501

DATED this 2/

day of April, 1992.
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KEITH H. CHIARA #0621
ATTORNEY AT LAW
37 East Main St
P. O. Box 955
Price, UT 84501
(801) 637-7011
Attorney for Defendant

^ T H DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff;

ORDER

vs.

fO-y/

ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY,
Defendant.
The
before

Defendant's

motion to withdraw his

guilty

pleas

came

this Honorable Court on the 20th day of April, 1992; the

Defendant
the

Criminal No. -&G±OGSO£4=FS

appeared in his own behalf, unrepresented by

State

was represented by the Carbon County

counsel,

Attorney,

Gene

Strate.

The Court reviewed Defendant's motion and memorandum

in

support

thereof,

of

and

finding good cause for

the

granting

Defendant's motion, now therefore;
IT

IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the Defendant's pleas of

guilty

in the above entitled matter are hereby withdrawn and the Defendant

is

remanded

to the custody of the

Carbon

County

pending further proceedings in this matter.
DATED this ^&Z.

day of

Z^^tf

, 1992
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June 23, 1992

The Honorable Judge Boyd Bunnell
Judge, Seventh Judicial District Court
for Carbon County
Carbon County Court Complex
149 East 100 South
Price, Utah 84051
Re:

Adrian Russell Hickey
Criminal No. 90-41

Oear Judge Bunnell:
Dr. Payne is out cf town for sometime. I have therefore examined the above
defenaant and providing the'following report.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION:
This is a 19 year old single Caucasian male who comes from a very
dysfunctional family 1n which the parents and all nine children used street
drugs and alcohol to excess. This patient started smoking marijuana at age
11. He increased it until he used 1t dally. He has a history of cocaine use
at 13. He overdosed on LSD at 14 and has continued to use crank and crack ano
continued to have some flashbacks up to the date of his original admission.
The patient was originally admitted to Utah State Hospital on October 16. 1990
and discharged January 31, 1992. He was referred by the PSRB to the Board of
Pardons who placed him back in prison. He was then readmitted on the May 26,
1992 for a 30 day evaluation.
The patient has a long history of delinquent criminal and mentally 111
behavior. He has been admitted Into state hospitals in Georgia, Kentucky, and
Colorado and has been on psychiatric medication on and off for a considerable
time.
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Adrian Russell Hickey
Oune 23. 1992
Page 2
PAST DIAGNOSIS:
Axis
Axis

I
II

310.10 Organic Personality Disorder (explosive type)
304.90 Poiysubstance dependency NOS
301.70 Antisocial Personality Disorder
Axis III
Borderline Intellect
Full scale 10 is 64 - 85, which places him in the mild mentally defective to
borderline intellect. He also has a history of Attention Deficit Disorder and
learning disorder as a child which probably was not treated at that time.
On admission to Utah State Hospital on May 26, 1992, the patient stated that
he had no particular complaints. He was "asking for an appeal of his ,
sentence. I think the case can be overturned and I will go free." He also
stated that time that he was subject to "blackouts," in which he stated he
starts to sweat and get nervous and does not remember what happens.- However,
his account of these attacks does not correspond to anything pathological and
if they in fact occur, they are prooably hysterical dissociations.
The patient was dressed appropriately. He was quiet and cooperative. He had
a flat affect and stated that sometimes he heard what he described as
"voices," but stated that were "roaring noises like a tiger" and at times he
claimed to see "green demons." He has attempted suicide in the past
approximately three times, but denied any thoughts of suicide at this time.
He showed poor judgment. He was oriented and his memory, both recent and
remote, appear to be intact.
The patient was placed on Tegretol 200 mgs twice a day, on
Sorentil 300 mgs each night, Prozac 40 mgs each morning, Ativan 1 mg 3 times a
day, and Trezodone 150 mgs at night for sleep. The Tegretol was later
increased to 400 mgs twice a day.

TREATMENT:

On this regime, he has done very well. He has three times been 1n seclusion
for aggressive behavior, but apart from that, has shown relatively normal
behavior.
COMPETENCY: The patient 1s fully aware of the charges against h1m and the
nature of those charges being felonies. He 1s aware the possible sentences
and can discuss the possible plea bargains that he might make. He understands
the roles of the court officers, the prosecuting attorney, the judge, and his
defense attorney, who I think he is able to assist 1n his own defense, and to
discuss the circumstances of the crime and possible pleas.
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Adrian Russell Hiclcey
June 23. 1992
Page 3
It 1s my opinion that this patient is now competent to proceed to trial in
accordance with Sections 71-15-1 of the Utah Code and that he will remain so
as long as he stays on his present medications on a long term basis in
whatever environment he may be.
If I can give you any further Information, please let me know.
Sincerely,

lOJfiyTi^
( S '

3. Anthony Glllett,
G
to,MPH
Bd. Cert. Am. Bd. Psych. Neuro.
Clinical Director

JAG:skh
cc: Keith Chiara, Defense Attorney
37 East Main Street
Price, Utah 84501
Gene E. Strate, Carbon County Attorney
County Office Building
120 East Main Street
Price, Utah 84501
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Diplomate in Clinical Psychology
Diplomate in Forensic Psychology
American Board of Professional Psychology

June 23, 1992
The Honorable Boyd Bunnell
Judge, Seventh Judicial District Court
for Carbon County
Carbon County Court Complex
149 East 100 South
Price, Utah 84051
Re:

Utah v. Adrian Russell Hickey

Criminal No. 90-41

Dear Judge Bunnell:
This letter is in response to your letter dated June 22, 1992. I have known
Mr. Hickey for quite sometime. I saw him when he was first at the hospital
as not competent to proceed and then participated in the report which
resulted in his being found guilty and mentally ill.
I also was involved, though not as directly, when the decision was made to
send him to the Psychiatric Security Review Board after he had been at
the hospital for quite a period of time.
When I saw him on June 3, 1992, I thought that he was in better shape
than when he was sent to the Psychiatric Security Review Board after
having reached maximum hospital benefits.
Utah Code 77-15-2 indicates, "for the purposes of this chapter a person is
incompetent to proceed if he is suffering from a mental disease or defect
resulting either: (1) in his inability to comprehend the nature of the
proceedings against him or the punishments specified for the offense
charged; or (2) in his inability to assist his counsel in his defense.
On June 3, I was satisfied that he was still competent to proceed. As I
said in my report, he is of reduced intellectual ability and undoubtedly has
an organic disorder, but nevertheless, I believe that pursuant to Utah Code
77-15-2, he does have both a rational and factual understanding of the
nature of the proceedings against him or at very least he can be educated
of them. Further I believe he understands the penalties attached to the
charges and finally, I believe that he can assist his lawyer in a rational
and factual manner. Thus I believe that he is competent to proceed.
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Adrian Russell Hickey
June 23, 1992
Page 2
The court should know that just today he refused to take his medication
because he was not allowed to smoke when he wanted to. I do not think
this kind of behavior is a product of mental illness, but rather personality
traits.
I hope this report is sufficient
Sincerely yours,

Robert J. Howell, Ph.D.
1190 North 900 East #237
Provo, Utah 84604
RJH: mr
cc

Keith H. Chiara, Defense Attorney
37 East Main Street
Price, Utah 84501
Gene E. Strate, Carbon County Attorney
County Office Building
120 East Main Street
Price, Utah 84501
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
STATE CF UTAH
GENE STRATE #3137
Carbon County Attorney
Carbon County Courthouse
120 East Main Street
Price, Utah 84501
(801) 637-4700
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

vs.

i
1

ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY,

i

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S
MENTAL COMPETENCY
Criminal No. 90-41

Defendant.

The above-named defendant appeared on July 6, 1992, together with his
attorney, KEITH H. CHIARA, and the Court and counsel for the defendant and for
the State having received written reports of mental evaluations performed at
the Utah State Hospital, the agency designated by the Department of Human
Services to evaluate the defendant's mental condition; and counsel for the
defendant and for the State having stipulated in open court that the written
evaluations of ROBERT J. HOWELL, PhD, and J. ANTHONY GILLETT, MD & MPH, be
considered by the Court without formal testimony from said examiners or other
witnesses; and the Court having duly reviewed said evaluations;
The Court finds that the defendant, ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY, is fully
aware of the nature of the charges against him and the possible penalties for
those charges? that he is able to assist counsel in his defense and to
discuss possible plea negotiations with said counsel; and that he is
rationally and factually able to comprehend the proceedings in this case; and
based on these findings,
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IT IS ORDERED thatxhe defendant is mentally competent to proceed.
DATED this

X d a v of July, 1992.

7

BOYDBtfNNEJZf, Judge-

:STE^OF MAILING
CERTIFIC7
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order on Defendant's Mental Competency, postage prepaid, on this
o

day of July, 1992, to:

Keith H. Chiara, Attorney at Law, P. 0. Box

955, 37 East Main, Price, UT 84501.

£**£
MADALENE C. WILLIAMS, Secretary
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STATE CF UTAH

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
\

ADRIAN HICKEY,
Petitioner/

ORDER

:

VS,

J

BOARD OF PARDONS, et a l w

:
Case No. 950700359

Respondents,

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ADRIAN HICKEY,
Defendant.

:

Case No. 90-41

The Plaintiff having filed on May 17, 1996 a Motion for
Preparation of Transcripts and Administrative Records together with
a Motion for Appointment of Counsel in Case No. 950700359, and the
Court having reviewed the file and finding a Motion for Stay of
Proceedings filed by the Defendant herein upon which no action has
been taken, the same having been filed on April 8, 1996, the Court
now concludes that an Order staying the proceedings should be
entered herein.

Based upon the Stay Order the Court declines to
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2

make

any

Transcripts

further
and

orders

on

the

Administrative

Appointment of Counsel.

Motion

Records

for
and

Preparation
the

Motion

of
for

The Court does note, however, that a

previous Motion for Appointment of Counsel and for Transcript has
been made in this matter and the Court has previously denied
counsel and ordered in the associated matter that the best efforts
of the Clerk be used to obtain transcripts.

Because of the

difficulty in discovering the whereabouts of the former reporter
for this Court, it is likely that said transcripts may in fact be
impossible to obtain.
Based upon all of the foregoing this matter is hereby stayed
until such time as the Supreme Court rules on the matter of Payne
vs. The Utah State Board of Pardons, et al.
In case no. 90-41 Mr. Hickey has moved to withdraw his plea.
It appears that he has, on another occasion, moved for such relief
and that the same was denied by Judge Lyle Anderson.

Certainly at

this point in time the Court should deny the Motion for Withdrawal
of the plea as being untimely and to the extent that the matter has
been ruled upon by another Judge that that decision is res judicata
^^y^

herein.
DATED this «•*==*

day of June, 1996.
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tA^t^w^

'VfrRlfrW Uic,^.
Length of Hospitalization:

;qe:

l * f w o

SEX:

/ H

. ^ i / V _; -Admission Cate: - £z-2^22.01scharge Date: b?' l/C-

(Discharge Diet: (?j ^.
Q .^/"p • v
Oischarge M e d i c a t i o n ^ ! record as ordered):

A l l e r g i e s : r i 5 Af ?
'mr i i [ Mj n, t n inni —

-ffT^

Medicaf/Treatment^ol low-up:
••-co

C..T

CURRENT PHYSIOLOGICAL STATUS
A.

Weight

^ ^ ^

1. Stable^:
5*

pounas

2. Fluctuating
fee

*

}!

3. Recent ' c s s _ 4. Recent g a i n _

B.

Height

C.

Blood Pressure

E.

Summary of significant abnormal lab finaings

F.

Adverse Drug Reactions:

5. Normal forage.

inches

11 c / 1 £>

0. Pulse

SUtr^vure of Registered Nurse
If you have any questions concerning follow-up care contact:
Name:
Name:

T K

fe»///*£/*
Physician

^±
Supervising

T

elephone Number: 373-4400, Extension ¥Jl

Telephone Number: 373-4400, Extension 7 5
Registered Nurse

Patient Teaching:
Comments:
This shee^ has-been explained to-me aoo^I understand the above:
Signature of Patient ^ r e s p o n s i b l e Person
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
"STATE OF UTAH,
TRANSCRIPT OF
SENTENCING

Plaintiff,
vs.
ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY,

Judge Boyd Bunnell
Criminal No. CR 90-41

Defendants.

BE IT REMEMBERED that the above-entitled action came
on for sentencing on July 6, 1992, commencing at the hour
of 9:30 a.m. before the Honorable Boyd Bunnell, District
Court Judge, in the Utah and was electronically recorded.

APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:

Gene Strate
Carbon County Attorney
Carbon County Courthouse
Price, Utah 84501

For the Defendant

Keith H. Chiara
Attorney at Law
P. 0. Box 955
Price, Utah 84501
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p R 0 C E E D I N 6 S

COURTC
THE COURT:
YS-L

Number 90-41, State of Utah

Adrian Russell Hickey.
MR. CHIARA:

Your Honor, I represent --

THE COURT: Let's wait unti]. the Defendant
1

comes in.
MR. CHIARA:
THE COURT:

All right.
The record may show that the

Defendant is present together with his counsel.

The

Court has received the reports from the alienists and
doctors who were appointed at the State Hospital to
examine him relative to his competency to proceed with
trial.

Let's see.

Mr. Chiara, you received copies of

those reports, have you?
MR. CHIARA:

I have, Your Honor.

Your

Honor, I talked with Mr. Strate just before court began
this morning, and we would join with him in requesting
that the Court pass this matter to early this afternoon.
THE COURT:
matter until 1:30.

All right.

We'll pass this

Is that going to be a convenient

time?
MR. CHIARA:

Fine.

THE COURT:

All right.

We'll pass this

2
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matter until 1:30 this afternoon.
(Off the record.)
THE COURT:

We'll take State of Utah vs.

Adrian Russell Hickey, Criminal No. 90-41.

We didn't --

Did we enter an order relative to his competency to
proceed?

Did we cover that?
MR. CHIARA:
THE COURT:

We haven't yet.
Okay.

We'll have the record

show that the Defendant and counsel are present and counsel for the State is present. The Court has received the
reports from the Forensic Unit of the Utah State Hospital
relative to the examination that was conducted of Mr.
Hickey pursuant to the request of the Court.

I have the

reports from Dr. Howell and also from Dr. Payne relative
to those examinations relative to his competency to
proceed.
And, Mr. Chiara, you've had access to copies of
those, have you?
MR. CHIARA:

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So, what's your pleasure?

Do

we set this matter for hearing, or are you willing to
just stipulate to those reports in as the record relative
to his competency?
MR. CHIARA:

Just a moment, Your Honor.

(Off-record conversation.)
3
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MR. CHIARA: We would stipulate that he is
competent at this point, Your Honor, and we are prepared
to proceed.
THE COURT: All right.

The reports indi-

cate that in the opinion of the doctors, he is competent
to proceed and understands the nature of the proceedings
and is able to assist his counsel in the disposition of
this matter. And now I indicate he is willing to stipulate to that fact.
MR. CHIARA:

If the Court would like to

direct questions to Mr. Hickey, the Court may.
THE COURT:

You understand, Mr. Hickey,

what we're doing here?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: You agree that these reports,
the Court can take those into consideration in making its
ruling?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT:

And you don't wish a hearing

where we have them come down and -- You could have a
hearing where we'd have them come down and testify relative to their findings and so on.

Do you wish that to

take place?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: You don't think that's neces4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1

sary at this time?

2

THE DEFENDANT:

3

THE COURT:

No.

I see.

Well, the Court, based

4

upon those, will find that he is competent to proceed;

5

that he understands the nature of these proceedings, and

6

he is not only factually able to proceed and to assist

7

counsel, but is also rationally able to do so.

8

• So, what

9

is the situation then, gentlemen,

relative to the case?

10

MR.

STRATE:

We

discussed

a

possible

11

disposition, Your Honor.

12

disposition.

'*

We would propose, Your Honor, under what is presently

'*

Count I, Aggravated Robbery, Mr. Hickey be allowed to

'*

enter a Guilty plea to the included offense of Robbery,

'*

which would be a second-degree felony.

'' I

I believe we arrived at a

This would involve four different counts.

It is also my understanding that he is willing

18

to enter Guilty pleas to Count III, Aggravated Assault,

19

which has the victim Alice Olsen; Count IV, Aggravated

20

Assault, which has the victim Melvin Heil, as presently

21

set forth; and also Count V, the included offense of

22

I

Kidnapping, which is a second-degree felony. Whereupon,

*' I

the State would move to dismiss the remaining counts.

** I

That would be two second-degree felonies and two third-

** J

degrees that he would be pleading to.
5
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1

The State also, as part of plea negotiations,

2

will j oin in the recommendation that he be sentenced

3

concurrently <on those.

4

the last time

5
6

I believei that's what happened

THE COURT:

Count III is a third-degree

felony, is it not?

7

MR. STRATE:

Yes, 'iTour Honor.

8

THE COURT:

Count IV is also a third-

10

MR. STRATE:

That' s correct.

11

THE COURT:

9

12

degree felony'P

he's willing to do that?

13

MR. CHIARA:

14

THE COURT:

15

Is that correct, Mr. Chiara,

MR.

STRATE:

He is, Your Honor.
All right.
I believe

the other

two

16

defendants in this case were sentenced concurrently as

17

well, Your Honor.

18

THE COURT:

I see.

Well, Mr, Hickey, why

19

don't you and your counsel come up right here to the

20

rostrum, and we'll talk to you a little bit about this.

21

Your counsel, Mr. Hickey, has handed me what is

22

entitled "Statement of Defendant" which you have signed,

23

which explains to you some of your legal and constitu-

24

tional rights and explains to you that if I accept your

25

pleas of Guilty on those counts as indicated, that you
6
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would be giving up those rights. You understand that, do
you?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT:

You went over this statement

with your counsel?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT:

Is there any of those para-

graphs that you didn't understand or you understood them
all when you went through them with him?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: He explained them to you, did
he?
THE DEFENDANT: Right.
THE COURT:

I still have to make certain

on the record, Mr. Hickey, that you understand what some
of your rights are that you are waiving.

One is that you

would be entitled to a trial by jury, if you care to have
one.

Do you understand you have that right?
THE DEFENDANT: Right.
THE COURT: You further understand that if

a trial were held, you could either testify, or you could
choose not to testify.

And, if you chose not to testify

at trial, that fact could not be held against you in any
way.

You understand you have that right not to testify?
THE DEFENDANT: Right.
7
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THE COURT: You further understand that if
a trial were held, you and your attorney would have a
right to be present, to examine all witnesses that were
presented against you, and you'd have the right to subpoena witnesses in your own behalf; you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:

Right.

THE COURT: Do you further understand that
if a trial were held and you were convicted, you would
have a right of appeal to an appellate court?

If for any

legal reason you felt the trial was not fairly conducted
or you disagreed with some of the rulings of the court,
you would have a right of appeal. Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:

Right.

THE COURT: And do you understand that if
I accept your pleas of Guilty as to these charges, you
would be giving up those rights -- you'd be waiving them.
Do you understand?
THE DEFENDANT: Right.
THE COURT: And that's what you're doing,
if I accept your plea.

You understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yea.
THE COURT:

Now, Mr. Hickey, if a trial

were held, the State would have to prove what we call the
elements of each of these offenses.

For instance, under

-- Well, first of all, I guess I better get your plea on
8
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these before we proceed any further.

I should have done

that.
Let me ask you then, Mr. Hickey, to the lesserincluded offense under Count I of -- It would be the
lesser-included

offense

of

Robbery

alleged

to have

occurred on or about August 4th of 1990, this being a
second-degree felony involving the taking of some property from Alice Olsen, what is your plea:

guilty or not

guilty?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Guilty.

And to Count III, Aggravated

Assault, this being a third-degree felony alleged to have
occurred on or about that same date involving the victim
of Alice Olsen, what is your plea: guilty or not guilty?
THE DEFENDANT:

Guilty.

THE COURT: And as to Count IV, Aggravated
Assault, a third-degree felony alleged to have occurred
on or about that same date involving Melvin Heil, H-e-i1, what is your plea on that charge?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Guilty.

And to the lesser-included

offense of Kidnapping under Count V, which would be a
second-degree felony involving the kidnapping of a person
whose initials are J.S. alleged to have occurred on or
about that same date, what is your plea to that count?
9
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1

THE DEFENDANT:

2

THE COURT: All right. Now, before I can

3

accept those pleas, Mr. Hickey, I have to make sure you

4

Guilty.

are aware of the rights we were just talking about. And

5

if I were to re-ask you those questions, your answers

6

would be the same, would they?

7

THE DEFENDANT: Right.

8

THE COURT:

Now, Mr. Hickey, if we tried

9

this case, the State would have the burden of proving

10

beyond a reasonable doubt what we call the elements of

11

the offense. Under Count I they would have to prove that

12

you took personal property from Alice Olsen or from her

13

immediate presence by the use of either force or fear and

14

that you intended to deprive her of that property.

15

State would have to prove that beyond a reasonable doubt.

16

If I accept your plea to that count, you're telling me

17

that you actually did it, you see?

18

those factual elements.

The

You're admitting to

Do you understand that?

19

THE DEFENDANT:

20

THE COURT:

Right. Right.

And under Count III, if we

21

were to try it, the State would have to prove that you

22

did assault Alice Olsen and that you used either a

23

dangerous weapon or other means likely to produce death

24

or serious bodily injury while attempting to do bodily

25
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you're also admitting to those elements.

You understand

that?
THE DEFENDANT:

Right.

THE COURT: And under Count IV, Aggravated
Assault, as applies to Melvin Heil, the State would still
have the burden of proving the elements of that offense,
too; that is, you intentionally and unlawfully caused
serious bodily injury to Mr. Heil and that you did it
with use of a dangerous weapon or other means likely to
produce death or serious bodily injury. And, if I accept
your plea of Guilty to that count, you're also telling me
that factually you did that.

Do you understand?

THE DEFENDANT: Right.
THE COURT:

And Count V, the lesser-

included offense of kidnapping, the State would have to
prove that you seized this person illegally and intentionally; that you transported him with the intent to
either conceal or to deprive the legal custodian of the
person.

And the State would have to prove that also.

And, if I accept your plea of Guilty to that count,
you're also admitting factually that you did that.

Do

you understand?
THE DEFENDANT: Right.
THE COURT:

Now, Mr. Hickey, the maximum

sentence that I can impose under Count I, if I accept
11
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1

your plea, is a term of not less than one nor more than

2

fifteen years in the Utah State Prison or a fine or both.

3

Under Count III, the maximum sentence that I can impose

4

would be a term not to exceed five years in the Utah

5

State Prison or a fine or both. Under Count IV, the maxi-

6

mum term would be a term not to exceed five years or a

7

fine or both. ' And under Count V, the maximum term I

8

could impose would be a term of not less than one nor

9

more than fifteen years or a fine or both. And you under-

10

stand that whatever sentence is imposed is entirely up to

11

me; is that correct?

Do you understand that?

12

THE DEFENDANT:

13

THE COURT:

Yea, I do.
Of course, there is the

14

possibility that we could make those sentences run either

15

concurrently or consecutively, and the counsel have

16

already stated their recommendations to me, and I don't

17

see that I have any reason not to follow that recommenda-

18

tion.

But you understand I'm not legally bound to do so?

19

THE DEFENDANT: Right.

20

THE COURT:

21

I can deviate from that, if I

decide to?

22

THE DEFENDANT: Right.

23

THE COURT:

24

THE DEFENDANT: Right.

25

THE COURT:

You understand that?

Are you entering this of your
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own free will, Mr. Hickey, other than the fact that the
State has agreed to allow the entry of the plea as indicated to the lesser offenses and to dismiss the balance
of the Information and to make the recommendation it did
relative to sentencing?

Other than that, has anyone made

you any promises or any inducements to get you to enter
this plea?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT:

So you are doing it of your

own free will then?
THE DEFENDANT: Right.
THE COURT:

The Court finds that the

Defendant is aware of what his legal and constitutional
rights are and that he is freely and voluntarily waiving
those.

And we'll order, then, that the pleas of Guilty

to those counts be entered and, upon motion of the State,
will order that the balance of the counts in the Information be dismissed.
Do you wish sentencing to take place at this
time, Mr. Chiara?

The law provides that you can -- I

can't impose sentence less than two days nor more than
thirty from this date, but you can waive that and be
sentenced now, if you wish to do so.
THE DEFENDANT:

I'd like to be sentenced

now.
13
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1

THE COURT:

2

You'd like to be sentenced

now?

3

THE DEFENDANT: Yea.

4

THE COURT:

All right.

The Court has

5

already heard the recommendation of the State, so the

6

Court will order that the Defendant be imprisoned in the

7

Utah State Prison for a term of not less than one nor

" J

more than fifteen years under Count I, for a term of not

9

to exceed five years under Count III, for a term of not

10

to exceed five years under Count IV, and a term of not

11

less than one nor more than fifteen years under Count V.

12 I

And, since this all arose out of a common criminal

'3

episode, the Court will order that the sentences run

'*

concurrently -- together, at the same time.

'5

ordered committed to the warden of the Utah State Prison

1*

for the imposition of that sentence.

And he is

17

J

MR. CHIARA:

Thank you, Your Honor.

,8

I

THE COURT:

Court is in recess at this

'9 I
*^ I

time.
(Sentencing concluded.)

21
22
23
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CERTIFICATE

STATE OF UTAH
) ss.
COUNTY OF EMERY

I, Teresa Manzanares, do hereby certify that I am a
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah;
That

sentencing

in

the

above

matter

was

electronically record and said electronic recording was
caused by me to be transcribed into typewriting; and the
foregoing pages numbered 2 to 14 constitute a full, true
and correct report of the same.
c

DATED this 19th day of February, 1997

\^^v^aJ/n-

uX^

Teresa Manzanares
Notary Public
Residing at Ferron, Utah

My Commission Expires
March 1, 1997
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NOTARY PUBUC* STATE of UTAH
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